"The CEC has exercised its rightful authority under party bylaws and state law. That decision stands, and it deserves respect. The party must now direct every ounce of its energy toward executing what it voted for, supporting the candidates fully with 100% effort, and hold Dallas County Election officials accountable for successful execution of the elections under the new laws that actually solve the problem."
The Dallas County Republican Party is entering the May 2026 runoff season after a difficult and costly internal dispute. A chairman has resigned. A writ of mandamus has been filed against a county election official. The County Executive Committee (CEC) must spend time replacing its leadership rather than organizing voters. And a legal dispute over how ballots are cast — precinct-based versus countywide vote centers — threatens to once again disenfranchise the very Republican voters the party exists to serve due to the incompetence of the Dallas County Elections department.
The honest truth at the core of all of this is straightforward: the underlying concern was real, the advocacy that drove it into public view mattered, and the Texas Legislature has substantively addressed the actual problem at its source. This article examines he main premise, that precinct-based voting meaningfully protects ballot secrecy in ways that countywide voting does not, and the broader concerns about election integrity, both to reassure Republican voters that there are laws that resolve the problem, and that their votes are secure either way when the law is followed.
This article lays out the facts, the law, and the path forward — because Dallas County Republicans deserve honest answers, credit where credit is due, and a party ready to finish the work that remains. Given the strong concerns raised on this topic when presenting the resolution to the CEC April 20, 2026, this article will outline current successes in solving the problem, and outlining the remaining steps to secure our elections for the future.
How We Got Here: A Costly Chapter, Honestly Told
The start of the recent challenges was in the fall of 2025, when Dallas County Republican precinct chairs voted to require precinct-based voting for the 2026 Republican Primary Election Day, abandoning the Countywide Polling Place Program that Dallas County has used since 2019.(DCRP, 2025, September 15) In December 2025, the party formalized this decision in a signed contract with Dallas County Elections Administrator Paul Adams, then publicly announced it would stand down from the original hand-count plan for the March 2026 primary.(Norred Law, 2026)(KERA, 2025, December 30)
The reasons for standing down from the hand count were explained publicly by then-DCRP Chairman Lt. Col. Allen West on December 30, 2025 — 63 days before the March 2026 primary — and were grounded in operational facts, not a change of principle. First, staffing: the hand-count plan required between 3,000 and 3,300 trained counters across Dallas County, and only 1,300 to 1,500 had signed up by late December, leaving the party roughly half-staffed with the contract deadline of December 31 looming. (KERA, 2025, December 30) Second, legal exposure: under Texas law, election judges who fail to tabulate and deliver results on time can face a second-degree misdemeanor, and Lt. Col. West stated he was unwilling to put volunteer judges and the organization in that position given the staffing shortfall. (KERA, 2025, December 30)
Third, cost and reimbursement: the party had raised approximately $500,000 against a Texas Secretary of State reimbursement cap of roughly $1 million that would have been shared with the Dallas County Democratic Party, while projected expenses — tables, chairs, ballot printing for an expanded ballot that included 10 new state initiatives, and paid counting clerks — were on track to exceed what reimbursement would cover.(KERA, 2025, December 30) Lt. Col. West framed the decision as a facts-based call: “There’s some people that are upset about it, but … when you evaluate the facts … people understand,” and signaled the party’s intent to attempt a hand count again in 2028 using the lessons learned from the 2026 effort.(KERA, 2025, December 30) In other words, the September 2025 vote set the goal; the December 2025 stand-down was a responsible mid-course correction when the funding, manpower, and legal-risk conditions attached to that goal could not be met in time.
The precinct chairs who led this effort — Barry Wernick, Dan Woodward, Jim Biesel, and more than 200 precinct chairs who voted for the September 15, 2025 resolution — raised four specific concerns about election integrity in Dallas County. Each deserves to be represented accurately and answered honestly. Those four concerns are:
- Ballot secrecy — that public records could be cross-referenced to link a voter to their ballot;(Wernick, 2026)
- Electronic pollbook failure — that the ES&S system which malfunctioned in November 2024 should be removed;(Dallas County Republican Party, 2025, February 3)
- Hand counting of ballots — that voters deserve an independent, human check on electronic tabulation;(Dallas County Republican Party, 2025, September 15)
- Auditability — that countywide voting, in Mr. Wernick’s words, was a source of “lack of true auditability.”(Wernick, 2026)
These concerns are documented in Mr. Wernick’s own campaign materials, in Lt. Col. West’s own public statements, and in the September 15, 2025 party resolution. They were raised in good faith. This article engages each of them directly — not by dismissing them, but by showing where each stands today under current law and current facts.
Expand: The Four Concerns in Detail — Presented in the Chairs’ Own Words
This section presents the positions of the chairs themselves, drawn directly from their own published statements and resolutions. Each concern is then addressed in its proper place in the article body that follows.
Concern 1 — Ballot Secrecy
Barry Wernick, candidate for Dallas County Commissioner District 2 and a central voice in the September 2025 CEC vote, states on his campaign website: “As a result of our recount of the March 5, 2024 Republican Primary, we uncovered evidence of broken chain of custody, fraud, unsigned ballots, missing ballots, and much more. It didn’t take long to realize that countywide voting was a source of a lot of these issues and lack of true auditability… we uncovered evidence confirming that just under 20,000 Dallas County and well over 100,000 Texas voters’ constitutional rights of voter privacy and ballot secrecy were violated.”(Wernick, 2026) On May 17, 2024, Mr. Wernick formally sent a “declaration of truth and a petition for a redress of grievances” to the Texas Secretary of State and the county judges and election administrators of the 96 Texas counties then using the Countywide Polling Place Program under Texas Election Code §43.0007.(Wernick, 2026) That concern — that the identification of individual voters’ ballots is possible under current Texas election records practices — is real, is acknowledged by the Texas Secretary of State’s own elections director under oath, and is the subject of active federal litigation.(CBS Austin, 2024, June 11)(PILF v. Harris County, 2024) This concern is addressed in full in Section 2 and Section 3 of this article.
Concern 2 — Electronic Pollbook Failure (ES&S)
During the November 2024 General Election, ES&S electronic pollbooks malfunctioned at Dallas County early voting locations, causing approximately 4,000 voters to receive ballots tied to incorrect precincts.(Texas Tribune, 2025, January 28) Chairman Allen West, on behalf of the Dallas County Republican Party, issued a public statement on February 3, 2025: “I applaud the decision of the Texas Secretary of State office in decertification of the ES&S epollbooks. The Dallas County Republican Party has made this issue known since our request for an independent audit of the Dallas County Elections Department last June. Our concerns were evidenced in the November 2024 election which we publicly addressed. Now is not the time for Dallas County to replace one failed system with another.”(Dallas County Republican Party, 2025, February 3) This concern is addressed in Section 4 of this article.
Concern 3 — Hand Counting of Ballots
On September 15, 2025, the Dallas County Republican Party CEC passed a resolution titled “Resolution to Eliminate the Electronic Voting System and Implement Precinct-Based, Hand-Marked Paper Ballot Voting and Hand Counting for Election Day and Hand Counting Mail Ballots.”(Dallas County Republican Party, 2025, September 15) The resolution’s stated purpose was to provide voters with an independent, human verification of electronic tabulation and to strengthen voter confidence in the counting process. The party raised over $400,000 and recruited more than 1,000 volunteers in pursuit of this goal.(Votebeat, 2025, December 9) This concern is addressed in Section 6 of this article.
Concern 4 — Auditability
Mr. Wernick’s own words, published on his campaign website: “It didn’t take long to realize that countywide voting was a source of a lot of these issues and lack of true auditability.”(Wernick, 2026) The concern is that voters should be able to verify, precinct by precinct, that the electronic tabulation of their ballots matches the actual ballots cast — and that countywide voting obscures that verification. This concern is addressed in Section 3 of this article.
The chairs who raised these concerns did so in good faith and in service of the integrity of Dallas County elections. What follows is an honest examination of each concern against current law and current facts — not to dismiss the concerns, but to show where each stands today.
The key rationale out of the four concerns, repeated by precinct chairs on the CEC, was election security — specifically, the claim that countywide voting uniquely created vulnerabilities that could allow bad actors to identify individual voters’ ballot choices.(Fulcrum, 2026, March 29) As will be examined in detail below, this claim about countywide voting specifically is not supported by the evidence.
On March 3, 2026, the effort to execute precinct based voting was put to the test. Because Texas law requires both parties to agree to countywide voting for a joint primary, Dallas County voters of both parties were assigned to cast ballots at neighborhood precincts on Election Day — even though early voting had used countywide centers.(Votebeat, 2026, March 4) The result was not ideal:
- At least 12,674 voters went to the wrong polling location on Election Day.(Texas Tribune, 2026, March 24)
- At least 6,641 Democratic voters (7.7% of Democratic turnout) and 2,369 Republican voters (6.4% of Republican turnout) went to the wrong sites.(Texas Tribune, 2026, March 24)
- Dallas County spent $1 million attempting to notify voters of the change.(Texas Tribune, 2026, March 24)
- A district judge extended voting hours to 9 p.m. to address the “mass confusion” — only for the Texas Supreme Court to intervene and order post-7 p.m. ballots segregated as provisional.(CNN, 2026, March 3)
- Approximately 2,450 provisional ballots were set aside, their ultimate status uncertain.(NBC News, 2026, March 3)
Early voting — spanning the two weeks before Election Day — remained countywide throughout. The “precinct-based” change applied only to a single day. Tens of thousands of voters never knew.
The DCRP distributed accurate polling place data to voters ahead of Election Day. The compounding failures of March 3 trace directly to the Dallas County Elections Department’s own operational breakdowns. The Texas Secretary of State’s voter lookup tool, VoteTexas.gov — which the DCE is responsible for keeping current — published incorrect polling place listings on Election Day, misdirecting voters who relied on the official state-maintained tool.(Votebeat, 2026, March 4)(CNN, 2026, March 3) The Dallas County Elections Department’s own website crashed under the volume of voters attempting to find their correct location on Election Day itself.(NBC News, 2026, March 3) Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins reported that some polling locations turned away as many as 90% of arriving voters.(CNN, 2026, March 3) These failures — incorrect official data, a crashed elections website, and inadequate operational execution — fall squarely on the Elections Department, not the party.
After the primary chaos, Dallas County Republican Chair Lt. Col. Allen West recognized the danger of repeating this disaster for the May 26 runoff. He signed an amended contract with Adams in late March 2026, returning to countywide vote centers. West stated plainly: “Pursuing precinct-based operations for the runoff Election Day poses greater risks and could lead to voter confusion. To then shift for the one day runoff election to precincts would result in widespread disruption.” (NBC News, 2026, March 18)
Rather than recognizing the practical wisdom of this decision, a faction within the CEC legitimately declared West’s amendment invalid, citing state law provisions vesting contracting authority in the executive committee, not the chair alone.(Dallas Observer, 2026, April 20) Thirty-five precinct chairs signed a petition against him.(Dallas Observer, 2026, April 15) A vote on his removal, called for by Lt. Col. West in defense of his decision, was scheduled for April 20, 2026.
West resigned on April 14, 2026 — before the vote could be held. (CBS News Texas, 2026, April 14) In his departure statement, he was direct: “My removal will not be due to any nefarious, corrupt or scandalous actions on my part. It will be because a group of individuals wishes to have their way and expose the organization to potential harm.” (Dallas Observer, 2026, April 15) The tenor of the dispute — including personal criticism and attacks of West before the contentious CEC meeting — contributed to that resignation. Whatever one thinks of the underlying contract decision, that outcome is not one the party should be proud of.
On April 20, 2026, 35 precinct chairs filed a writ of mandamus against Elections Administrator Paul Adams, seeking to compel him to implement precinct-based voting for the May 26 runoff despite West’s amended contract.(Norred Law, 2026, April 20) Adams has stated the contract cannot be changed before runoff early voting begins, and has indicated he intends to proceed with the countywide arrangement.(Dallas Observer, 2026, April 20) Vice Chair Tami Brown-Rodriguez now serves as interim chair.
The DCRP now enters the critical midterm runoff season without a permanent chair, caught in litigation, and at risk of another voter confusion event that may result in a legal battle that could further distract the DCRP from the mission of winning this election.
Examining the Premise: Does Precinct-Based Voting Provide More Ballot Secrecy?
The argument for precinct-based voting rested on ballot secrecy, as was made very clear during the presentation of the resolutions during the April 20th meeting. The claim: countywide voting creates a unique vulnerability because voters can cast ballots far from their registered precinct, and that geographic anomaly — combined with other public election records — could allow a bad actor to identify how a specific person voted.(Votebeat & Texas Tribune, 2024, May 28)
There is a real ballot secrecy vulnerability in Texas. It was confirmed by the Texas Secretary of State’s own elections director, Christina Adkins, under oath before the Texas House Elections Committee.(CBS Austin, 2024, June 11) Investigators at Votebeat and the Texas Tribune verified and replicated the identification process in May 2024.(Votebeat & Texas Tribune, 2024, May 28) The conservative publication Current Revolt claimed to have obtained and identified the ballot of Matt Rinaldi, then-Chair of the Republican Party of Texas.(Current Revolt, 2024, May 21) The vulnerability is real.
But here is the part of the argument the data does not support: the vulnerability does not originate with countywide voting, and precinct-based voting does not eliminate it. The reverse is closer to the truth.
How Ballot Identification Actually Works
Peer-reviewed research published in 2025 by Kuriwaki, Lewis, and Morse in the National Institutes of Health / PMC journal identified the specific data elements — called “quasi-identifiers” — that enable a bad actor to link a voter to their ballot choices.(Kuriwaki et al., 2025) These three elements are:
- Precinct assignment — which precinct the voter is registered in
- Ballot style — which combination of races appeared on the voter’s ballot
- Vote method — whether the voter voted in person, by mail, or provisionally
Critically, all three of these data points are found in both the publicly available voter history file and election results data — regardless of whether the county uses countywide voting or precinct-based voting.(Kuriwaki et al., 2025) Precinct is the primary linking key in any identification attack. It is not a solution to the problem; it is the mechanism of the problem.
The Bipartisan Policy Center, in its 2025 analysis of ballot image and cast vote record exposure, confirmed: “These risks are especially heightened when precincts are small and write-ins are recorded.”(Bipartisan Policy Center, 2025) Small precincts — exactly the units that precinct-based voting amplifies — are where the vulnerability is most acute. A precinct with 50 voters where 48 voted the same way leaves one or two voters exposed through elementary process of elimination, without ever accessing a ballot image or cast vote record.
“The quasi-identifiers that generate vote revelation are available in both individual ballot records and aggregate election results.”
The countywide model actually introduces ambiguity into the cross-precinct dataset: a voter at a multi-precinct vote center might have received any of several ballot styles, obscuring the linking chain rather than clarifying it.(Bipartisan Policy Center, 2025) The precinct-based model removes that ambiguity entirely — every voter is permanently and deterministically assigned to one precinct, making the quasi-identifier set fixed and precise for every single person.
| Vulnerability Factor | Countywide Voting | Precinct-Based Voting |
|---|---|---|
| Primary linking key (precinct) present in public voter history file | ✓ Present | ✓ Present — and fixed for every voter |
| Voter pool size sharing same quasi-identifiers at single location | Larger — hundreds to thousands share a vote center, increasing anonymity | Smaller — limited to one precinct’s voters; easier to isolate individuals |
| Risk from small voter pools enabling process-of-elimination identification | Lower — cross-precinct mixing dilutes the pool | Higher — small precinct voters are maximally exposed |
| Risk for unusual vote methods (provisional, mail) in small precincts | Lower | Higher — unusual method + tiny precinct = near-certain exposure for some voters |
| Aggregate precinct-level results as an attack vector | ✓ Present — same precinct data published regardless | ✓ Present — identical data published; no reduction in aggregate attack surface |
| Location-based anomaly (voter at distant vote center) as attack vector | Narrow risk for ~2–5% of voters who travel to a distant center | Eliminated for this narrow category only |
| Net exposure for typical voter | Equal to or less than precinct-based | Equal to or greater than countywide |
Sources: Kuriwaki et al. (2025)(p. 1); Bipartisan Policy Center (2025)(para. 8); SOS Advisory 2024-20(Texas SOS, 2024, June 6)
The argument that reverting to precincts eliminates the ballot secrecy vulnerability is not supported by the empirical research. It trades one narrow exposure risk for a broader, more systematic one — and does so while making it harder for every Texan to vote.
The underlying concern is also the subject of active federal litigation. In Zimmern v. Harris County, No. 4:24-cv-04439 (S.D. Tex., filed November 12, 2024), the Public Interest Legal Foundation has pressed essentially the same claim on behalf of Harris County voters, with Mr. Wernick serving as a key affiant providing methodology evidence.(PILF v. Harris County, 2024) That case remains pending — and its ultimate resolution will turn on the same combination of statutory redactions, criminal penalties, and administrative advisories analyzed in the remainder of this article. Regardless of the court’s eventual ruling, the legislative and administrative framework already in place does the core work of protecting ballot secrecy in Texas today.
The Law That Already Solves This Problem
Even setting aside the comparative exposure analysis, there is a more fundamental problem with the entire internal battle the DCRP has been fighting: the Texas Legislature already passed the solution, and it is the law of the land.
Texas law now imposes a comprehensive, multi-layered framework of ballot secrecy protections that apply to every county, regardless of whether it uses countywide or precinct-based voting.
| Law / Authority | What It Requires | Effective | Penalty for Violation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tex. Const. Art. VI, §4 | Secret ballot is a constitutional right; purity of the ballot box is mandatory(Texas Const., 1876/amended) | Foundational | Constitutional Violation |
| Tex. Elec. Code §1.012(h) (HB 5180, 2023) | Election custodian must redact all personally identifiable information — including precinct identifiers, location data, ballot style markers, and ballot numbers — before any ballot image or cast vote record is released for public inspection(Texas Legislature, 2023) | Sept. 1, 2023 | Criminal if Willful |
| AG Opinion KP-0463 (2024) | Redaction duty extends to combinations of data — records that become identifying when cross-referenced with other public records must also be redacted(Texas AG, 2024) | Binding immediately | Official Misconduct |
| SOS Emergency Advisory 2024-20 | All counties must redact: location at which a voter cast a ballot; precinct information on ballot images; polling place identifiers; sequential ballot numbers(Texas SOS, 2024, June 6) | June 6, 2024 | Mandatory Compliance |
| Senate Bill 2753 (89th Leg., 2025) | Results reported by precinct and location but NOT broken down by precinct within a location; early voting and Election Day reported as a single "in-person" category — eliminating early voting data as a voter identification vector(Texas Legislature, 2025a) | Sept. 1, 2025 | Mandatory Compliance |
| Tex. Elec. Code §276.013 (HB 5115, 89th Leg., 2025) | Election fraud — including deliberately releasing records exposing ballot choices — is a felony. Elected officials acting in official capacity face the highest charge(Texas Legislature, 2025b) | Sept. 1, 2025 | 1st-Degree Felony (elected official) 2nd-Degree Felony (private person) |
| Tex. Elec. Code §61.006 | Communicating how a specific voter voted — using information obtained at a polling place — is a felony(Texas Elec. Code §61.006) | Existing law | 3rd-Degree Felony |
| Tex. Elec. Code §276.001 | Retaliating against a voter based on their ballot choices is a felony(Texas Elec. Code §276.001) | Existing law | 3rd-Degree Felony |
| Tex. Elec. Code §129.003 (SB 1, 2021) | All voting machines must produce a voter-verifiable paper record that the voter reviews before submission; paper record is the official ballot for recounts(Texas Legislature, 2021) | Full compliance: Nov. 3, 2026 election | Mandatory; Non-compliant systems barred |
This framework means that as of September 1, 2025, any election official who releases ballot records without the mandatory redactions can be prosecuted for a first-degree felony if they hold elected office and act in their official capacity — punishable by 5 to 99 years or life in prison.(Texas Legislature, 2025b) The constitutional right to a secret ballot is now backed by the most serious criminal penalties in the Texas Election Code.
This framework also directly addresses the auditability concern that Mr. Wernick and the precinct chairs raised. In his own words on his campaign website: “countywide voting was a source of a lot of these issues and lack of true auditability.”(Wernick, 2026) Under Tex. Elec. Code §129.003 (SB 1, 2021), every voting machine used in Texas must produce a voter-verifiable paper record the voter reviews before submission — with the paper record serving as the official ballot for any recount or contest.(Texas Legislature, 2021) Senate Bill 827 (89th Leg., R.S., effective September 1, 2025) then layers a mandatory Post-Election Hand Count Audit on top of that paper trail, applicable to Election Day, early voting in person, and mail ballots alike.(Texas Legislature, 2025d)(Texas SOS, 2025, October 31) The Secretary of State’s own guidance confirms the audit applies identically in countywide polling place counties as in precinct-based counties — same statutory requirements, same sample sizes, same chain of custody.(Texas SOS, 2026, March 4) Auditability is not lower under countywide voting. It is identical under Texas law today.
It is also worth naming, clearly and without reservation, that the public pressure which helped produce this framework came in significant part from grassroots Republicans, precinct chairs, candidates, and election observers across Texas — including Mr. Wernick himself. His May 17, 2024 declaration of truth and petition to the Secretary of State and 96 county election administrators, and the Dallas County precinct chairs’ sustained advocacy through 2024 and 2025, directly contributed to the awareness that led to SOS Emergency Advisory 2024-20, the strengthened enforcement posture behind HB 5115, the early-voting-data fix in SB 2753, and the expanded hand-count audit framework in SB 827.(Texas SOS, 2024, June 6)(Wernick, 2026) The internal disagreement in Dallas County over the runoff contract does not erase that contribution — and it should not. Mr. Wernick, Lt. Col. West, the former executive committee, the current precinct chairs, and the candidates now running all share credit for elevating these issues onto the legislative agenda where they have been, and continue to be, substantively addressed.
Every single law in the framework above was authored, championed, and passed by Republican-led legislatures and signed by Republican governors — built on the groundwork of grassroots Republican advocacy across Texas. Senate Bill 1 (2021) — the voter-verifiable paper ballot mandate — was authored by Sen. Bryan Hughes (R-Mineola) and Rep. Andrew Murr (R-Junction) and signed by Gov. Greg Abbott.(Texas Legislature, 2021) House Bill 5180 (2023), establishing the redaction duty under §1.012(h), was authored by Rep. Terry Wilson (R) and passed the Texas House 133–1.(Texas Legislature, 2023) Senate Bill 2753 (2025), closing the early-voting-data identification vector, was authored by Sen. Bob Hall (R) with co-authors Sens. Brent Hagenbuch (R) and Tan Parker (R) and sponsored in the House by Rep. Carrie Isaac (R).(Texas Legislature, 2025a) House Bill 5115 (2025), elevating the penalty for willful disclosure to a first-degree felony for elected officials, and Senate Bill 827 (2025), mandating the Post-Election Hand Count Audit, were both products of the Republican-led 89th Legislature.(Texas Legislature, 2025b)(Texas Legislature, 2025d) This is a Republican record of delivery on election integrity — statute by statute, session by session, chair by chair, candidate by candidate — that the entire party can and should stand behind.
With those protections now in force, the legislative solution the concern called for already exists. The exposure pathway this internal dispute was ostensibly fought to address has been closed by statute at its source.
The Practical Reality: What Each Model Asks of Dallas County
Beyond the legal and data analysis, there is the simple practical question: which system can Dallas County actually administer well, and which produces better outcomes for all voters — Republican, Democrat, independent, and nonpartisan alike? Election administration quality is not a partisan issue. Every voter deserves a functional system regardless of party.
The March 3, 2026 primary answered that question definitively: $1 million in taxpayer-funded voter notifications, 12,674 wrong-precinct voters, 2,450 provisional ballots of uncertain validity, a Texas Supreme Court emergency order, and a district court lawsuit — all generating national media coverage of voter disenfranchisement in Dallas County.(Texas Tribune, 2026, March 24) (CNN, 2026, March 3)
Both models can work. Each carries its own logistical profile and its own trade-offs, and the question for Dallas County is not which model is ideologically preferable but which can be administered well on the timeline available and with the resources on hand. Countywide vote centers concentrate operations at fewer, larger, better-staffed locations that any voter can use regardless of address — reducing equipment footprint, simplifying supervision, and giving voters flexibility.(Fulcrum, 2026, March 29)
Precinct-based voting distributes operations to the neighborhood level, which proponents argue improves voter-to-location connection and community accountability — but requires sufficient poll judges and election workers for every individual precinct across a large, sprawling county, a staffing and logistical challenge well-documented across Texas counties where poll worker shortages are routine.(Votebeat, 2025, December 9) Neither model is inherently more or less secure under current Texas law; both operate under the same constitutional, statutory, and administrative framework detailed in Section 3.
The practical question — and a forward-looking one worth raising here — is also how each model would accommodate the hand counting goal that Dallas County Republicans pursued in 2025. The States United Democracy Center and The Elections Group, in their 2024 analysis of full hand count implementations across the country, observed that distributing hand counts to the precinct level “adds substantial complexity,” noting that “supervision and quality control cannot be centralized,” mail ballots must be routed to individual precincts for counting, and “potentially thousands of ballots and hundreds of tally sheets” must then be moved back to a central location for aggregation — creating risks of “human error in counting, improper chain of custody, misplaced tally sheets and ballots, premature disclosure of results, errors in aggregation, and security flaws.” (States United & The Elections Group, 2024)
By contrast, consolidated hand counting at a smaller number of vote-center locations allows centralized supervision, unified chain of custody, simpler bipartisan observer access, and fewer total workers per ballot counted. If Dallas County ever advances beyond SB 827’s mandatory Post-Election Hand Count Audit toward more expansive hand counting, the countywide-center model is likely the easier, lower-risk logistical path — a consideration worth weighing when the hand count question is revisited in future cycles.
One of the concerns the precinct chairs raised directly — distrust of the ES&S electronic pollbooks after the November 2024 failures — has already been resolved by the Texas Secretary of State and by Dallas County itself. On December 17, 2024, the SOS formally decertified the ES&S ExpressPoll system after it failed seven technical and three functional state standards.(Texas Scorecard, 2025, February 3) On February 11, 2025, the Dallas County Commissioners Court voted 4–1 to approve a $7.6 million contract with KnowInk for 4,500 replacement poll pads, with the Secretary of State reimbursing 80% of replacement costs through a HAVA grant program.(Dallas County Commissioners Court, 2025) (Government Technology, 2025, February 12)
Lt. Col. Allen West publicly endorsed the decision on behalf of the DCRP: “I applaud the decision of the Texas Secretary of State office in decertification of the ES&S epollbooks.”(Dallas County Republican Party, 2025, February 3) The bad system was caught, reported, decertified, and replaced — a legitimate election integrity success already in hand, achieved through the proper channels and supported by the same chairs who raised concerns about it.
Every additional layer of complexity handed to Dallas County Elections Administrator Paul Adams is another opportunity for failures that hurt voters across the political spectrum. Regardless of which voting model is in place, simplifying administration and holding the Elections Department accountable for clean execution is the posture that best serves election integrity for everyone.
This analysis is offered in the spirit of factual transparency, not to undermine the CEC’s authority. The CEC exercised its legitimate right under party bylaws and state law, and that decision deserves respect. The concern here is not the outcome of that vote — it is about ensuring it was made for the right reasons, grounded in the evidence, and that the DCRP now directs its energy toward holding the Dallas County Elections Department fully accountable for executing it properly. Whatever voting model is in place, the Elections Department must perform, and the party must hold it to that standard.
The Decision Has Been Made: Now the DCRP Moves Forward Together
The CEC has exercised its rightful authority under party bylaws and state law. That decision stands, and it deserves respect. The party must now direct every ounce of its energy toward executing what it voted for — and executing it well.
The legal reality, as of today, is that Adams has stated the runoff contract cannot be changed before voting begins and intends to proceed with the countywide arrangement.(Dallas Observer, 2026, April 20) The mandamus petition filed on April 20 may or may not succeed — courts have significant discretion, and timing constraints before May 18 early voting begins are severe.(Norred Law, 2026, April 20)
Whatever the courts decide, the imperative is the same: the DCRP must get to work. That means interim leadership under Vice Chair Brown-Rodriguez stabilizing the organization immediately, precinct chairs filling every available poll judge seat, and the full force of the party machine directed at voter outreach, turnout, and supporting Republican candidates from the runoff all the way through the November general elections. The internal dispute is over. The candidates need their party. It is time to move on and get it done.
The DCRP should also place trained poll watchers at every polling location to monitor for any procedural irregularities and to document any compliance failures with the mandatory redaction requirements already required by state law. That is the legitimate, productive channel for ballot security vigilance — not internal contract disputes.
Hold the Dallas County Elections Department accountable. The DCE failed Dallas voters on March 3 — through an incorrect VoteTexas.gov voter lookup, a crashed county elections website, and inadequate operational execution despite $1 million in public resources.(Votebeat, 2026, March 4)(NBC News, 2026, March 3) Every failure must be documented. Under whatever model is in place for May 26, poll watchers must record every incident in writing. Where election officials have failed to follow the laws already on the books, the party must pursue accountability — through the Texas Secretary of State, the Texas Attorney General’s Election Fraud Unit, and the courts. The DCRP must not absorb blame for DCE’s failures, and officials who fail in their statutory duties must face consequences.
Every legitimate concern about ballot secrecy has a home — in Austin, in the courts, and in the law. The DCRP’s energy should now be directed at completing the legislative agenda that will actually finish the job, not at relitigating a contract dispute after the fact.
The Unfinished Legislative Agenda: Closing the Last Loophole
While the new state laws have substantively addressed the ballot secrecy problem for the vast majority of voters, one statutory gap remains. The current framework criminalizes the disclosure and use of ballot identification information but does not yet explicitly criminalize the act of acquiring it through bulk cross-referencing of public records.
House Bill 242 (89th Legislature, 2025) was designed to close this gap by creating a new criminal offense for obtaining personally identifiable voter information that connects a voter to their ballot choices.(Secure Democracy USA, 2025)(Texas Legislature, 2025c) Its final enacted status requires verification. If not yet enacted, it must be a legislative priority — and, like the rest of the framework documented in Section 3, its enactment and enforcement will be a Republican legislative achievement, built on the groundwork of grassroots Republican advocacy across Texas.
The complete architecture needed to protect ballot secrecy at every stage of a potential attack — from bulk data aggregation through individual identification, disclosure, and use — along with advancing hand-count capacity for voters who want it and securing the Republican primary against outside interference, requires six components:
- HB 242 enacted: Criminalize the aggregation and acquisition act itself, not just disclosure and use downstream.(Secure Democracy USA, 2025)
- Tiered access controls: Restrict bulk programmatic access to election records to credentialed election officials, auditors, and court-authorized investigators — preventing unlimited public bulk requests for election datasets.
- Small precinct aggregation: Require that results from precincts below a minimum voter threshold be merged before publication — eliminating the “singleton” exposure risk confirmed by peer-reviewed research as the residual pathway that survives even mandatory redaction.(Bipartisan Policy Center, 2025)(Texas Tribune, 2024, June 25)
- Mandatory audit logging: Require that all public records requests for ballot images and cast vote records be logged and flagged for bulk pattern requests — creating accountability for bad-faith aggregation attempts.
- Advance hand-count capacity statewide: Build on SB 827’s mandatory Post-Election Hand Count Audit by authorizing and funding expanded hand-count pilots, standardizing chain-of-custody and bipartisan observer protocols for any jurisdiction that elects to hand count — under either countywide or precinct-based models — and producing a uniform statewide hand-count procedures manual so the option is available, reliable, and transparent wherever local parties and voters want it.(Texas Legislature, 2025d)(States United & The Elections Group, 2024)
- Close the Republican primary to Republican voters: Finish the work already begun by the Republican Party of Texas — Rule 46 adopted at the 2024 state convention with roughly 73% ballot-proposition support, amended by the State Republican Executive Committee in June 2025, and now the subject of a September 2025 federal lawsuit joined by Attorney General Ken Paxton — by enacting state-level legislation to secure a closed Republican primary against outside interference and to harmonize state law with party rules.(Texas Tribune, 2024, June 10)(Republican Party of Texas, 2025, June 16)(Texas Policy Research, 2025, October 13)
These six measures, combined with the laws already in force, would create a complete legal barrier at every stage of any ballot identification attack chain — and, in the case of the closed-primary item, would also secure the operational foundation that makes the other five work. This is the legislative agenda worth fighting for. This is where the party’s passion, political capital, and organizational energy should now be directed.
A closing note on closed primaries. The single biggest operational constraint exposed by the 2026 hand-count stand-down was capacity — 3,000 to 3,300 trained counters needed, fewer than half signed up, and a ballot universe expanded by open-primary participation and 10 new state initiatives. (KERA, 2025, December 30) Closing the Republican primary to Republican voters directly addresses that constraint. A closed primary defines a smaller, verified universe of Republican voters, which in turn makes precinct-based voting logistically realistic, makes rigorous hand counting feasible in future cycles, and makes observer coverage and chain-of-custody simpler to administer at the precinct level.
The Republican Party of Texas has already done the hard political work — Rule 46 at the 2024 convention, the SREC amendment in June 2025, and the federal lawsuit in September 2025 joined by Attorney General Paxton. (Texas Tribune, 2024, June 10)(Republican Party of Texas, 2025, June 16) (Texas Policy Research, 2025, October 13) The job now, in Austin, is to pass state-level legislation that secures that closed primary in statute and harmonizes state election law with the party’s rules — so that the Republican primary in Dallas County, and in every Texas county, is a Republican-only contest by law, with a voter universe defined clearly enough to make precinct-based administration, observer coverage, and future hand counting operationally realistic.
A personal note on hand counting: I believe hand counting ballots, done rigorously and under the right logistical conditions, is a valuable complement to machine tabulation — and something Texas should continue to advance. The States United/Elections Group 2024 analysis is clear that the logistical burden of full hand counts is lower when operations are consolidated at a smaller number of well-supervised centers than when dispersed across many individual precincts.(States United & The Elections Group, 2024) Under either voting model, with SB 827 already in force and the fifth framework pillar above in place, Texas can build an election system that delivers paper-verifiable, hand-count-auditable, felony-protected secret ballots in every county. That is a worthy goal, and it is one Republicans should pursue on the strength of a legislative record already well underway — not through intra-party contract disputes.
"I will fully support getting these final legislative items passed in the Texas House to close our primaries, fully protect ballot secrecy, the sanctity of our elections, and to hold election officials across Texas accountable and punish those who violate the integrity of Texas elections."
Conclusion: The Right Fight, Together, in the Right Place
The principle at the heart of this dispute — that every Texan has the right to cast a secret ballot free from coercion, retaliation, or exposure — is correct, important, and worth fighting for.(Texas Const., Art. VI, §4)(Texas SOS, 2024, June 6)
But the fight must be targeted at the actual problem. The ballot secrecy problem was real. The Texas Legislature addressed it. The remaining gap is a narrow technical vulnerability requiring targeted legislation — not a contracting dispute between party leaders built on a premise the data does not support.
Allen West was right that returning to precincts for a single runoff day, surrounded by countywide municipal elections on all sides, exposed the party to increased risk and voter confusion. (NBC News, 2026, March 18)(Votebeat, 2026, March 4) The data confirms he was also right — though this point was not made loudly enough — that the ballot secrecy premise underlying the original precinct-based decision was not empirically sound. He did not deserve the personal attacks that drove his resignation.
The DCRP moves forward now with the decision that has been made, the law that is already on the books, and the obligation to do better for Republican voters in Dallas County. That means stable leadership, effective voter outreach, full precinct chair accountability, and a focused legislative agenda in Austin that finishes the job of protecting the secret ballot — for every Texan, under either voting model. It also means three concrete forward commitments: holding the Dallas County Elections Administrator accountable on pollbook reliability and procedural compliance; building the capacity — funding, manpower, and standards — to deliver a hand-counted primary in future cycles under the right logistical conditions; and, as the foundation for both, finishing the work of closing the Republican primary to Republican voters so that the voter universe we administer, observe, and count is defined clearly in statute, not only in party rule.(Texas Tribune, 2024, June 10)(Republican Party of Texas, 2025, June 16)(Texas Policy Research, 2025, October 13)
To every precinct chair, every volunteer, every candidate, and every party leader who has spent the last two years on this fight: the concerns you raised mattered, your work contributed to the laws now protecting every Texan, and the next chapter needs every one of you. The disagreement over the runoff contract does not erase what you built, and nothing in this article is intended to say it does. What it is intended to do is put the facts on the table, point the way forward, and invite the entire party — leadership, former leadership, CEC members, chairs, candidates, and volunteers — to finish the job together.
And it means remembering that the legal victories already on the books are shared Republican victories. From Sen. Hughes and Rep. Murr on SB 1, to Rep. Wilson on HB 5180, to Sen. Hall and Rep. Isaac on SB 2753, to the 89th Legislature on HB 5115 and SB 827, to Mr. Wernick, Lt. Col. West, the DCRP precinct chairs, and grassroots election observers across Texas who pushed these issues into public view — the framework now protecting every Texan’s secret ballot is the product of work done by Republicans, together, over multiple sessions. That record should unite the party, not divide it. The next chapter — closing the aggregation loophole, advancing hand-count capacity statewide, and securing a closed Republican primary in statute — is the one we write next, together.
It is time to stop fighting the last battle and start winning the next one — together.