The Master Data Dashboard Resource for HD109

Data was drawn directly from the Texas Comptroller's Property Tax Assistance Division (PTAD) annual City Rates and Levies spreadsheets for tax years 2017 through 2025 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017-2025). The 2020 file was retrieved via the Internet Archive Wayback Machine after being removed from the Comptroller's live rates page. A 2016 dataset could not be located on the Comptroller's site or in web archives; the ten-year comparison therefore spans 2017-2025 (nine years of verified primary data), and this gap is disclosed rather than filled with an estimate. For each year, every Texas city's reported taxable value and total tax rate was extracted, and a taxable-value-weighted average rate was calculated for (1) all Texas cities statewide, (2) all cities located in Dallas County, and (3) the nine HD109 cities (Cedar Hill, Lancaster, DeSoto, Glenn Heights, Hutchins, Wilmer, Combine, Ferris, and Seagoville). Weighting by taxable value (rather than a simple unweighted average) ensures the comparison is not skewed by small cities with disproportionately high or low rates.

HD109 cities' weighted-average city property tax rate fell from $0.7426 per $100 of taxable value in 2017 to $0.6212 per $100 in 2025, a decline of about 16.3% (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017, 2025). Over the same period, the Texas statewide average fell from $0.5665 to $0.5316 (-6.2%), and Dallas County's average fell from $0.6882 to $0.6348 (-7.8%). Despite HD109's steeper rate cuts, HD109 cities were still taxed 16.8% above the Texas statewide average in 2025, though this is down sharply from a 31.1% gap in 2017. Compared to the rest of Dallas County, HD109 cities went from a 7.9% rate premium in 2017 to essentially rate parity by 2025 (about 2.1% below the county average), showing that HD109's largest tax-rate reductions — led by Lancaster (-30.9%) and Glenn Heights (-36.4%) between 2017 and 2025 — outpaced the rest of the county.

Individual city rates within HD109 vary widely: Seagoville carried the highest 2025 rate at $0.7207 per $100, while Combine carried the lowest at $0.3500 per $100 — a difference of more than double. This means the "average" HD109 rate masks meaningfully different tax burdens depending on which HD109 city a constituent lives in.

These figures cover city-portion tax rates only — they do not include school district, county, community college, or special district rates, which for most HD109 homeowners make up the majority of a total property tax bill. A full effective-rate or total-bill comparison would require combining city, county, school district, and special district rates for a representative property, which was outside the scope of this rate-only comparison. 2016 data could not be located from the Comptroller or web archives and is excluded rather than estimated. DeSoto figures reflect the full city, though only the eastern half of DeSoto falls within HD109; Ferris straddles the Dallas/Ellis county line, and this dataset captures Ferris as reported under the Dallas Central Appraisal District. Dollar-impact estimates referenced elsewhere (e.g., tax on a $300,000 home) are illustrative calculations applying the city rate only to a round-number taxable value, not actual average tax bills.

Data was drawn directly from the Texas Comptroller's Property Tax Assistance Division (PTAD) 2025 City Rates and Levies, County Rates and Levies, School District (ISD) Rates and Levies, and Special District Rates and Levies spreadsheets (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). For each taxing-unit type, a taxable-value-weighted average total tax rate was calculated statewide and for all units located in Dallas County. The HD109 composite was built city-by-city: for each of the nine HD109 cities (Cedar Hill, Lancaster, DeSoto, Glenn Heights, Hutchins, Wilmer, Combine, Ferris, and Seagoville), the city's own weighted-average city rate was added to the total rate of its primary school district, the Dallas County rate, and any identified special district (MUD) rate whose name explicitly matches the city. The nine city-level totals were then combined into a single HD109 composite using each city's own taxable value as the weight, so larger cities like DeSoto and Cedar Hill influence the composite more than smaller cities like Combine.

The core total property tax rate (city + county + ISD) for the HD109 composite was 1.9925 per $100 of taxable value in 2025, compared to 1.8940 statewide and 1.8730 for all of Dallas County — meaning HD109's core rate ran about 5.2% above the state average and 6.4% above the Dallas County average. When the two identified HD109 special districts (Lancaster MUD #1 and Wilmer MUD #1) are added, HD109's all-in composite rises to 2.2337 per $100. On an illustrative $300,000 home, that translates to roughly $6,701 per year in HD109 versus $6,108 in Dallas County overall and $6,031 statewide.

School districts are consistently the dominant component: ISD rates make up 58% of HD109's core total, 54% of the statewide core total, and 55% of the Dallas County core total. Within HD109, DeSoto (2.126 per $100) and Lancaster (2.988 per $100 including its MUD) carry the two heaviest all-in rates, while Combine (1.735) and Wilmer (1.857) carry the lightest.

HD109 is not an official Comptroller reporting geography — it is a composite approximation built by the author from overlapping city, county, ISD, and special-district units. Glenn Heights, Hutchins, Wilmer, Combine, Ferris, and Seagoville are each assigned to a single "primary" ISD (DeSoto ISD or Dallas ISD, based on the majority of the city's territory) even though small portions of some of these cities may fall in other districts (e.g., Ferris ISD also extends into Ellis County). DeSoto figures reflect the full city; only the eastern half of DeSoto technically falls within HD109. The special district search was limited to units whose name explicitly references an HD109 city; smaller or unnamed special districts (e.g., generic municipal utility districts, emergency services districts, or road districts) serving these cities may not be captured, so the "total incl. special" figures should be read as a floor rather than a ceiling on the special-district layer. All dollar-impact figures are illustrative calculations applying the estimated rate to a round $300,000 taxable value, not actual average tax bills for a real property.

Texas set its state sales and use tax rate at 6.25% in 1990, effective fiscal year 1991, and the rate has not changed in the 33 fiscal years since (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). This report tracks what happened to actual dollar collections over that same period, using the Comptroller's own year-by-year net collections data, to show what a fixed-rate consumption tax does as the underlying economy grows.

All revenue figures come directly from the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts' Sources of Revenue: A History of State Taxes and Fees, 1972-2024 report (January 2025 edition), specifically its Sales and Use Tax net collections table, which reports "All Funds" collections for every fiscal year from 1972 through 2024 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). Fiscal years run September 1 through August 31. Inflation adjustments use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), annual averages, rebasing every year's nominal dollar figure into constant fiscal 2024 dollars (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026). The revenue growth index in the third tab simply divides each year's nominal revenue by the fiscal 1991 baseline and multiplies by 100, so a reader can see the pace of growth in relative terms independent of dollar scale.

Nominal sales tax collections grew from $8.26 billion in fiscal 1991 to $47.24 billion in fiscal 2024, a 472% increase, without a single change to the 6.25% state rate (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). Even after removing the effect of inflation, real collections still grew from the equivalent of $19.01 billion to $47.24 billion in constant 2024 dollars — meaning a large share of the growth reflects genuine economic and population expansion in Texas, not just rising prices (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025); (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026).

The COVID-19 pandemic produced only a brief pause, not a collapse. Fiscal 2020 collections rose a modest 0.2% to $34.04 billion even as the pandemic shut down large parts of the economy for months (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). Growth resumed the following year (+5.6% in fiscal 2021) and then accelerated sharply to +19.4% in fiscal 2022, the single largest annual increase of the entire 33-year fixed-rate period, as reopening, stimulus-driven spending, and inflation combined to push collections to $42.99 billion (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). By fiscal 2024, collections reached $47.24 billion, roughly 5.7 times the fiscal 1991 level in nominal terms.

Two prior downturns are visible in the data and provide useful context: the dot-com/early-2000s slowdown produced a mild dip in fiscal 2002-2003, and the 2008-2009 financial crisis produced a two-year decline (fiscal 2009 down 2.7%, fiscal 2010 down a further 6.6%) before growth resumed in fiscal 2011 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). Both recoveries confirm the same pattern seen after COVID: a broad consumption tax dips only when actual consumer spending genuinely contracts, and rebounds automatically — without any legislative action — once spending recovers.

Because a sales tax is levied as a percentage of what people actually spend, a bigger economy and a bigger population mechanically produce bigger dollar collections at the exact same rate. No vote, no reassessment, and no rate increase were needed to grow Texas sales tax revenue nearly six-fold since 1991 — population growth, income growth, and business formation did that automatically (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). This is the central mechanical argument for why a jurisdiction relying on a broad sales tax, rather than a property tax tied to home valuations, can experience rising revenue purely from organic economic growth, and — if a taxing entity ever collects more than it needs to fund its services — has room to lower its rate over time rather than needing to raise it.

The 6.25% state rate has been fixed since 1991, but the tax base (what specifically is taxed) has seen minor legislative adjustments over the same period — including a temporary fireworks tax that was later repealed, changes to the Texas Emissions Reduction Plan (TERP) surcharge on off-road diesel equipment, a 2019 requirement that online marketplace providers collect the tax, and targeted exemptions added in 2023 for items such as maternity and baby hygiene products (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025). These base changes mean a small share of long-run revenue growth reflects adjustments to what is taxed, not solely economic and population growth, though the rate itself never changed. Local sales taxes (city, county, transit, and special-district add-ons, capped at a combined 2 percentage points on top of the state rate) are excluded from this analysis, which covers only the state's 6.25% portion (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2025).

This report compares the change in Texas median household income against the change in Texas median home value from 1969/1970 through 2024, with all dollar figures converted into constant 1966 dollars to isolate real purchasing-power change from inflation. The earliest year for which reliable, state-specific Texas data could be located was 1969 (income, from the 1970 Census) and 1970 (home value, from the 1970 Census of Housing); a complete continuous series back to 1966 itself does not exist in Census records, so 1966 is used only as the price-deflation base year via the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025).

In real, inflation-adjusted terms, Texas median household income grew modestly and unevenly — even declining during some periods — while Texas median home values grew far faster and more consistently, especially after 2010. The result is that median home value went from roughly 1.4 times median household income in 1970 to roughly 3.7 times median household income in 2024, meaning the affordability gap between what a typical Texas household earns and what a typical Texas home costs has more than doubled in real terms over this period.

Income series. Decennial Census benchmark values for Texas median household/family income were assembled directly from U.S. Census Bureau decennial releases: $8,490 for 1969 (American Statistical Association Proceedings, 1972), $16,469 for 1979 (United Press International, 1982), $27,016 for 1989 and $39,927 for 1999 (Demographia, 2001). From 1984 forward, the annual Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement series for Texas — as compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) from Census Bureau data — provides year-by-year figures through 2024 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2025).

Home value series. Decennial Census "Historical Census of Housing Tables" provide unadjusted (nominal) Texas median home values for 1970 ($12,000), 1980 ($39,100), 1990 ($59,600), and 2000 ($82,500) ("Median Home Values: Unadjusted," n.d.). The 2010 figure ($128,900) comes from American Community Survey estimates as compiled by the Texas Demographic Center (Texas Demographic Center, 2015), and the 2020 figure ($187,200) and 2024 figure ($302,999) come from the Zillow Home Value Index for Texas as republished via FRED, cross-validated against Zillow's own current reporting (Zillow, 2026).

Because decennial Census and ACS benchmarks for home value are only available roughly once per decade, annual-resolution movement between benchmark years was estimated using the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) All-Transactions House Price Index for Texas, available annually from 1975 forward (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2026). The FHFA index was scaled piecewise by the author so that it exactly matches the known Census/ACS dollar benchmarks at each decade point, with the index used only to approximate the shape of the path between those fixed points. This is a calculation performed by the author, not a figure drawn directly from any single source, and is disclosed here per the requirement to identify inferential or calculated data distinctly from directly reported source data.

All nominal dollar figures were converted to constant 1966 dollars using annual average CPI-U index values from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2025), using the formula: real value = nominal value × (CPI-U in 1966 ÷ CPI-U in the observed year).

Texas real median household income was essentially flat for the first 30 years of this period: it was actually lower in real terms in 2000 ($7,512 in 1966 dollars) than a household earning the 1970 median might expect after even modest real growth, and real income dipped notably in the 1980s before recovering. By contrast, real median home value grew in every decade except the 1980s, when Texas experienced an oil-bust housing downturn that temporarily depressed home values even in nominal terms. The home-value-to-income ratio rose from 1.41 in 1970 to 2.37 in 1980, eased slightly to 2.07 by 2000, then climbed steadily to 2.56 in 2010, 2.74 in 2020, and 3.72 by 2024 — the sharpest single jump of the entire series occurring in the four years between 2020 and 2024.

Using the annual FRED income series and the FHFA-interpolated home value series, real median household income in Texas grew from roughly $7,179 (1966 dollars) in 1984 to about $8,417 in 2024 — a real increase of only around 17 percent over 40 years. Over the same period, real median home value in Texas rose from roughly $21,082 to $31,296 (1966 dollars) — a real increase of roughly 48 percent, with nearly all of that increase occurring after 2012 and especially after the COVID-19 pandemic-era housing boom of 2020–2022. When both series are indexed to 1984 = 100, the real household income index stood at roughly 117 by 2024 (a 17 percent real gain), while the real home value index stood at roughly 148 (a 48 percent real gain) — visually confirming that Texas home prices have outpaced Texas household earning power in real terms, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis recovery and the 2020–2022 pandemic-era housing market surge.

The home-value-to-income ratio — how many years of gross household income it would take to purchase the median home outright — fell from approximately 2.56 in 2010 to 2.74 in 2020, then jumped sharply to roughly 3.72 by 2024, an increase of nearly one full year of household income needed to purchase a median home in just four years. This acceleration coincides with historically low mortgage rates and pandemic-driven housing demand of 2020–2022, combined with continued population growth into Texas that outpaced new housing supply, as reflected in the FHFA index's largest recorded single-year Texas appreciation rates occurring in 2021 and 2022 (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2026). A ratio below roughly 3.0 is generally considered affordable by historical housing-finance conventions; ratios above 4.0 to 5.0 are typically associated with severe affordability strain, meaning Texas's 2024 ratio of 3.72 sits meaningfully above the traditional affordability threshold.

No single continuous, annually reported, state-specific Texas dataset exists covering median household income and median home value back to 1966; the decennial Census only measured state-level median income and home value once every ten years prior to the American Community Survey's launch in the 2000s. The 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1999 income figures and the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 home value figures are therefore official Census-year snapshots rather than a continuous annual series. The annual home value figures for years between decennial Census/ACS benchmarks were calculated by the author by scaling the FHFA All-Transactions House Price Index for Texas to match the known dollar benchmarks at each decade point; these interpolated values should be understood as a reasonable estimate of the trend rather than an official reported statistic for any single year other than the anchor years themselves. This is a deductive calculation using an official, methodologically sound index (FHFA) anchored to official Census/ACS dollar figures.

The image labels a falling curve “U.S. household income at record low” and attributes it to the Census Bureau. The displayed endpoint is near $52,000 in 2025, while the beginning is near the upper-$80,000 range.

The check uses Census Table 2, “Households by Total Money Income, Race, and Hispanic Origin of Householder: 1967 to 2025.” The all-races median series is reported in constant 2025 dollars, using C-CPI-U for 2000–2025 and R-CPI-U-RS before 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

Where Census publishes parallel estimates for survey redesign or population-control transition years, this module uses the first, currently preferred row shown in the 2025 table and does not average the alternatives. The downloadable full series preserves one observation per calendar year and includes Census's published margin of error.

Real median household income was $56,230 in 1967, $73,560 in 2000, $85,320 in 2019, and $87,460 in 2025. The 2025 estimate was 2.6% higher than the revised 2024 estimate of $85,210 and was the highest on record dating to 1967 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

The viral curve appears directionally inverted: its approximate starting level resembles the current official value, while its approximate 2025 endpoint resembles the earliest official value. That is an inference from visual comparison, not proof of how the image was produced. The defensible conclusion is that the displayed line and “record low” label do not match Census data.

The Presidential Timeline tab overlays the same official Census real median household income series with a dashed line at the first annual observation in each presidency. Presidential names and tenure dates come from the House Office of the Historian (U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, n.d.-b); Democratic or Republican control of the White House comes from the same office’s party-government record (U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, n.d.-a); and service years were cross-checked against the Library of Congress chronological list (Library of Congress, n.d.). Because Lyndon Johnson took office on November 22, 1963, before the income series begins, his marker is pinned to the first available year, 1967. The markers show which president held office when each annual estimate was recorded. They do not isolate the effect of any administration from economic cycles, legislation passed by Congress, or methodology changes in the survey.

CPS ASEC estimates are survey estimates subject to sampling and nonsampling error. The historical series also includes documented changes to population controls, processing, questionnaire design, and interpolation methods. Census tests year-to-year comparative statements at the 90% confidence level and flags changes that are not statistically significant (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

Median household income is not a complete affordability index. It does not directly compare income growth with rent, home prices, groceries, insurance, or regional cost differences, and pretax money income excludes noncash benefits.

The image labels a steadily rising curve “U.S. poverty rate at record high,” marks it as the official poverty rate for all people from 1959 to 2025, and attributes it to the Census Bureau. Its curve begins near 5% and ends above 20%.

The check uses the all-races, all-people series in Census Table 3, “Poverty Status of People by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin Using the Official Poverty Measure: 1959 to 2025.” Census computes the official measure by comparing pretax money income with thresholds that vary by family size and composition (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

For years with parallel estimates caused by redesigns or updated population controls, this module retains the first, currently preferred row in the 2025 table. Counts are published in thousands and converted to millions only for display.

The official rate was 22.4% in 1959, declined rapidly during the 1960s, and then fluctuated mainly between roughly 11% and 15% from the early 1970s through the late 2010s. It reached 10.5% in 2019, rose to 11.5% in 2020, and then declined to 10.2% in 2025 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

The image's endpoints closely resemble the official endpoints placed in reverse order: official poverty was above 20% near the start of the series and near 10% at the end. That resemblance supports a reasonable inference that the visual was inverted or fabricated, but the image alone cannot establish who altered it or how.

The SPM includes refundable tax credits and noncash benefits such as SNAP and housing assistance, then subtracts necessary expenses including taxes, work expenses, child care, medical out-of-pocket costs, and child support paid. It also adjusts thresholds for housing tenure and geographic housing costs. The official measure does not make those adjustments (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

The SPM was 13.1% in 2025, statistically unchanged from 13.0% in 2024. Because the published SPM series begins in 2009, substituting it cannot explain a purported 1959–2025 official-rate chart.

The Presidential Timeline tab overlays the same official Census official poverty-rate series with a dashed line at the first annual observation in each presidency. Presidential names and tenure dates come from the House Office of the Historian (U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, n.d.-b); Democratic or Republican control of the White House comes from the same office’s party-government record (U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, n.d.-a); and service years were cross-checked against the Library of Congress chronological list (Library of Congress, n.d.). Because Dwight Eisenhower took office on January 20, 1953, before the poverty series begins, his marker is pinned to the first available year, 1959. The markers show which president held office when each annual estimate was recorded. They do not isolate the effect of any administration from economic cycles, legislation passed by Congress, or methodology changes in the survey.

Both measures are estimates from CPS ASEC and are subject to sampling and nonsampling error. A lower national poverty rate does not show that every geographic area or demographic group improved equally, and it does not mean families just above the threshold face no hardship.

The official measure has recognized scope limits: it excludes noncash benefits and refundable credits, does not subtract medical or work expenses, and uses national rather than geographically adjusted thresholds. Those limits are reasons to examine both OPM and SPM—not reasons to reverse the official historical series.