Misleading Posts - Did Governor Abbott Raise Your Property Taxes?
Did Governor Abbott Raise Your Property Taxes? What the Official Record Shows
A viral post says Texas property taxes rose 85% because of Governor Abbott and the state. The numbers are real. The conclusion is not. Here is what the Comptroller’s data, the 1979 Property Tax Code, and the House and Senate journals actually show.
The Claim
What the post says and the short answer
A post making the rounds, reproduced below, says Texas property taxes rose about 85 percent under Governor Greg Abbott (Eternal, 2026). It says school tax rates fell while property values more than doubled, so the higher bills must have come from Austin, not from local officials. I went to the original records to test every piece of it.
The headline number holds up. The statewide calculated levy grew from $48.15 billion in 2014 to $89.45 billion in 2025, an 85.8 percent increase (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2024) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-a). The school value and rate figures in the post also check out when the right measures are used (Texas Education Agency, 2026). What does not hold up is the conclusion drawn from them.
| What the post says | What the record shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| “Property taxes - up 85% under Abbott” ($48.15B to $89.45B) | Numbers accurate; up 36.6% after inflation; levied by local units, not the state | Misleading |
| “The STATE comptroller drives appraisal values” through the ratio study | Appraisal districts set every value; the ratio study only measures accuracy, and the school-funding study enforces a market-value floor that predates Abbott | Misleading |
| School taxable value $1.859T (2013) to $4.133T (2025) | Accurate; growth includes new construction and population | Accurate |
| Average school rate $1.33 (2014) to $1.01 (2024) | Accurate as a value-weighted rate; the drop was required and funded by state law | Accurate |
| “Locals didn’t do that” / “a sneaky guy in Austin” is raising taxes | Local units adopt every rate and budget; the market-value system dates to 1979 | False |
| Restricting local rate growth “preserves” state revenue | Texas has no state property tax; the levy goes to local units | False |
Texas has no state property tax. Appraisal districts set values, and cities, counties, school districts, and special districts adopt the rates and collect the money (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-d). The falling school rates the post cites are largely the result of state laws Governor Abbott signed to cut them. Rising values, new construction, population growth, and local spending kept total levies climbing anyway.
The rest of this article walks through the numbers, who controls each part of a tax bill, what Republican leadership actually enacted, and how each party voted—taken directly from the House and Senate journals.
A calculated levy is the Comptroller’s figure for taxable value multiplied by each local unit’s adopted tax rate. It is not the same as taxes actually collected, but it is the official statewide measure of how much property tax was imposed (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2024).
The Numbers
How much levies grew, and how much of it was inflation and population
Here is how the 85.8 percent breaks down by type of local government. School districts added the most dollars, but they grew the slowest. Counties, special districts, and cities more than doubled their levies (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2024) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-a).
| Taxing-unit type | 2014 levy | 2025 levy | Change | Share of increase |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| School districts | $26.57B | $41.65B | +56.8% | 36.5% |
| Counties | $7.45B | $16.79B | +125.4% | 22.6% |
| Cities | $7.77B | $16.73B | +115.4% | 21.7% |
| Special districts | $6.36B | $14.27B | +124.2% | 19.1% |
| Total | $48.15B | $89.45B | +85.8% | 100% |
Inflation and population explain part of it
Prices rose 36.0 percent over the same period, and Texas added about 4.2 million residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2025) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026). In 2025 dollars, the 2014 levy was about $65.5 billion, so the real increase was 36.6 percent. Per resident, the levy rose from about $1,753 to $2,821 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2024) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2025). That is still real growth—but it is far from the 85 percent in the post.
Homebuilding also surged: annual housing units authorized by permit rose from 99,701 to 140,579 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). More homes and businesses on the tax rolls means a larger levy even if no one’s rate goes up.
School Rates
Why school rates fell while values climbed
The post says the average school tax rate fell from about $1.33 to about $1.01 per $100 of value. That is accurate when the average is weighted by the value of each district’s tax base: $1.3248 in 2014 and $1.0193 in 2024. A simple average of all districts was lower in both years, $1.2648 and $0.9815 (Texas Education Agency, 2026).
Look at when the rate dropped. The two largest declines came in 2019 and 2023—the years state laws signed by Governor Abbott required and paid for school rate compression (Senate Committee on Finance, 2022) (Senate Research Center, 2023).
The 2019 school-finance law cut school maintenance and operations rates and set up automatic compression as values rise; its first-biennium cost was about $5 billion in state funds (Senate Committee on Finance, 2022). The 2023 law added another 10.7 cents of compression (Senate Research Center, 2023). Lower school rates are evidence of state relief, not evidence of a hidden state tax increase.
Rates also fell for other local governments from 2021 to 2025: the weighted rate fell 5.7 percent for cities, 4.7 percent for counties, and 3.9 percent for special districts (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-a). Those units are not compressed by the state, but since 2019 most must hold an election to raise revenue more than 3.5 percent a year (Texas Legislature, 2019).
Who Decides
Who controls each part of a Texas property-tax bill
The post treats Texas property taxes as one decision made in Austin. In reality, each part of a bill is decided by a different body.
Does the Comptroller drive appraisals higher?
The post says the Comptroller “through the appraisal district ratio study drives appraisals higher and higher and higher.” Two different state studies are involved, and neither one sets the value of your home.
- The ratio study the post links to only measures. Tax Code Section 5.10 requires the Comptroller to measure each appraisal district’s accuracy and uniformity at least every two years and publish the results (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-e). It carries no penalty by itself.
- The school property value study affects school funding, not tax bills. Under Government Code Section 403.302, the Comptroller estimates each school district’s taxable value for the school-finance formulas. If the appraisal district’s values fall outside a margin of error of no more than 5 percent, the state’s higher estimate is used to calculate that district’s state aid (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 403.302, 403.3011, 2024) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-f). Taxes are still billed on the appraisal district’s values; the district simply receives less state aid (Texas Education Agency, 2025).
- Your appraisal district sets your value. State law requires appraisal at market value, and every appraisal notice must say: “The Texas Legislature does not set the amount of your local taxes. Your property tax burden is decided by your locally elected officials” (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-g).
| Tax year | Status | Appraisal-district value | Value used for school funding | Difference | Districts more than 1% higher |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | final | $2.123T | $2.124T | 0.03% | 14 of 1018 |
| 2016 | final | $2.228T | $2.229T | 0.05% | 38 of 1018 |
| 2017 | final | $2.388T | $2.389T | 0.04% | 30 of 1018 |
| 2018 | final | $2.567T | $2.569T | 0.09% | 52 of 1016 |
| 2019 | final | $2.828T | $2.830T | 0.08% | 55 of 1016 |
| 2020 | final | $2.986T | $2.989T | 0.11% | 58 of 1015 |
| 2021 | final | $3.020T | $3.023T | 0.11% | 68 of 1007 |
| 2022 | final | $3.478T | $3.489T | 0.32% | 102 of 966 |
| 2023 | final | $3.905T | $3.912T | 0.18% | 86 of 1014 |
| 2024 | final | $4.117T | $4.119T | 0.04% | 47 of 1013 |
| 2025 | preliminary | $4.133T | $4.135T | 0.07% | 56 of 1013 |
The numbers settle the question. From 2015 to 2025, appraisal districts’ own school taxable values rose from $2.12 trillion to $4.13 trillion. In every one of those years, the value the state used for school funding was within one-third of 1 percent of the appraisal districts’ figure statewide (Texas Education Agency, 2026). The increase came from local appraisals tracking a rising market, not from the Comptroller substituting higher values. In 2016, for example, the Comptroller certified local value for 1,515 of the districts studied and state value for only 40 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017).
The state has overseen appraisal accuracy since 1979, first through the State Property Tax Board, whose duties moved to the Comptroller in 1991 (Haney, 2015). A House research report described the same 5 percent test and the loss of state aid in 2002, 13 years before Abbott took office (House Research Organization, 2002). In 2003 the Legislature softened the rule by adding a two-year grace period (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 403.302, 403.3011, 2024), and in 2016 the Comptroller read that grace period more generously (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2017). The Abbott-era amendments to the statute coincide with the relief laws, which adjust the study for larger exemptions and rate compression (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 403.302, 403.3011, 2024). I found no change since 2015 that tightened the 5 percent test.
The post is right that the state pushes appraisals toward full market value: a school district loses state aid if its appraisal district values property too low (Texas Education Agency, 2025). But that is a floor at market value, not a ratchet above it. Statewide, single-family appraisals have run slightly below market, at 98 percent in the Comptroller’s study (Haney, 2015). When the market rises, honest appraisals rise with it.
The market-value system is from 1979
Appraising property at market value through countywide appraisal districts was created by Senate Bill 621, the Property Tax Code, in 1979 (Texas Legislature, 1979b). The enrolled bill records Senate passage 17 to 6 with one pair, House passage 67 to 65, and Senate agreement to House changes 15 to 14 (Texas Legislature, 1979a). It was authored by Democratic Senator Grant Jones, carried in the House by Democratic Representative Wayne Peveto, and signed by Republican Governor Bill Clements (Legislative Reference Library of Texas, n.d.-a). The House’s own analysis of the bill from that session is preserved in the record (House Study Group, 1979). Governor Abbott took office 36 years later.
What “no-new-revenue rate” means
Every taxing unit must calculate a no-new-revenue rate—the rate that would raise about the same money from the same properties as last year—and a voter-approval rate (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-b). When values rise, the no-new-revenue rate falls. A council or board that adopts a higher rate is choosing to collect more from existing property, even if it advertises a rate cut.
The Relief
What Republican leadership enacted, 2015 to 2025
Since 2015, Republican-led Legislatures have passed, and Governor Abbott has signed, a series of property-tax relief laws. Each is listed below with what it did.
| Year | Measure | What it did |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | S.B. 1 / S.J.R. 1 (84th R.S.) | School homestead exemption raised from $15,000 to $25,000; state aid replaces lost school revenue ($1.24B GR cost, FY2016–17) |
| 2019 | S.B. 2 (86th R.S.) | Rollback rate replaced by voter-approval rate; 3.5% revenue-growth threshold for many units (was 8%); automatic elections; stronger notices |
| 2019 | H.B. 3 (86th R.S.) | School finance overhaul; state-funded compression of school M&O rates (initial cost about $5B for 2020–21) |
| 2021 | S.B. 8 (87th 2nd C.S.) | Homestead exemption available in the year the home is acquired (effective Jan. 1, 2022) |
| 2021 | S.J.R. 2 (87th 2nd C.S.) | School homestead exemption raised from $25,000 to $40,000 (voter approval May 2022) |
| 2023 | S.B. 2 / H.J.R. 2 (88th 2nd C.S.) | School homestead exemption raised to $100,000; 10.7 cents additional compression; 20% appraisal limit on non-homestead property under $5M (expires Dec. 31, 2026) |
| 2025 | S.B. 4 / S.J.R. 2 (89th R.S.) | School homestead exemption raised from $100,000 to $140,000 |
- Exemptions: the school homestead exemption went from $15,000 to $25,000, $40,000, $100,000, and now $140,000 (Senate Research Center, 2023) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-c).
- State money: the 2015 increase alone was estimated to cost $1.24 billion in state general revenue over two years (Legislative Budget Board, 2015).
- Limits on local growth: the 2019 law cut the revenue-growth trigger for an election from 8 percent to 3.5 percent for most cities and counties (Texas Legislature, 2019).
The Votes
How each party voted, from the official journals
A common follow-up claim is that Democrats voted against this relief. The journals show that is true for some votes and false for others, so it has to be stated measure by measure.
| Measure | Chamber and stage | Result | Republicans (yes–no) | Democrats (yes–no) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 S.B. 1 (exemption to $25,000) | Senate, final passage | 26–5 | 19–1 | 7–4 |
| 2015 S.J.R. 1 | Senate, final passage | 23–8 | 19–1 | 4–7 |
| 2015 S.B. 1 | House, final passage | 141–0 | 92–0 | 49–0 |
| 2019 S.B. 2 (3.5% election trigger) | Senate, final passage | 18–12 | 18–1 | 0–11 |
| 2019 S.B. 2 | House, third reading | 109–36 | 82–0 | 27–36 |
| 2019 S.B. 2 | House, final version | 88–50 | 81–0 | 7–50 |
| 2019 H.B. 3 (compression) | House, final passage | 148–1 | 82–1 | 66–0 |
| 2021 S.B. 8 and S.J.R. 2 | Both chambers | No nays | — | — |
| 2023 S.B. 2 (exemption to $100,000) | House, final passage | 133–4 | 83–0 | 50–4 |
| 2025 S.B. 4 (exemption to $140,000) | House, final passage | 143–0 | 84–0 | 59–0 |
In 2019, every House Republican who voted supported the law limiting how fast local governments can raise property-tax revenue without voter approval. Democrats cast all 50 House votes against its final version and 11 of the 12 Senate votes against it (Texas House of Representatives, 2019) (Texas Senate, 2019). In 2015, Democrats cast most of the Senate’s votes against the exemption increase (Texas Senate, 2015). But the 2019 school-compression law, the 2021 measures, and the 2025 exemption increase drew no Democratic opposition (Texas Senate, 2019) (Texas Legislature, 2021) (Texas Legislature, 2025).
What It Means
Why bills still rose, and what that means for HD109
If relief was real, why did bills keep rising? Because relief is measured against what the old law would have charged, not against last year’s bill. As a rough illustration, applying the 2014 school rate to the 2025 school tax base would produce about $54–55 billion, compared with the actual 2025 school levy of $41.7 billion (Texas Education Agency, 2026) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-a). That is not a formal estimate of savings, but it shows the scale at which compression offset rising values.
“The governor does not set the price of your home. The Legislature does decide how much of that value is taxed—and that is where reform has to happen.”— Will Campbell
State leaders are still responsible for the structure of the system. The Legislature can change appraisal standards, exemptions, limits, school-finance formulas, and how local rates respond to rising values (Texas Legislature, 2019) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-c). But maintaining the system is not the same as secretly raising local taxes, and the record shows the opposite direction of travel since 2015.
An observation on incentives
This is my policy observation, not a proven finding: a property-tax-dependent system can encourage local governments to expand their taxable footprint and chase more parcels and rooftops. That incentive can favor outward growth over disciplined, productivity-centered economic development—and that is not always in the community’s best interest. Economists who have modeled this find the property tax’s effect on sprawl is genuinely mixed, which is why I present it as an observation (Brueckner & Kim, 2003).
What this means for HD109
For families in Cedar Hill, Lancaster, DeSoto, Glenn Heights, Wilmer, Hutchins, Combine, Ferris, and Seagoville, the practical lesson is to look at each local budget and rate against its no-new-revenue rate, and to hold every level accountable for its own decision (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-b). The $140,000 school exemption applies to every qualifying homestead in the district (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, n.d.-c).
The Verdicts
Every claim tested on the numbers, the law, and the cause
The table below tests every claim in the post, and the main responses to it, on three separate questions: Are the numbers right? Does the law work the way the claim says? Does the evidence support the cause the claim assigns? A claim can have an accurate number and still earn a misleading verdict when it blames the wrong actor.
| Claim | Numerical finding | Legal finding | Causal finding | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Texas property-tax levies rose about 85% from 2014 to 2025. | Reproduced: 85.8% using the revised 2014 total ($48.15B) and 2025 working workbooks ($89.45B); 82.2% using the original 2014 report ($49.11B). | Levies are imposed by local taxing units (school districts, cities, counties, special districts); Texas has no state property tax. | Nominal growth only. After inflation, growth was 36.6%; per resident, 60.9%. The endpoint change does not identify who caused it. | Accurate figure; misleading attribution |
| Governor Abbott and state Republicans are responsible for that increase. | Not a numerical claim. School levies, which the state most directly shapes through compression, grew the least (56.8%); counties (125.4%), special districts (124.2%), and cities (115.4%) grew fastest. | The governor and Legislature write the rules; appraisal districts set values; local governing bodies adopt budgets and rates; voters approve bonds. | Shared responsibility. State relief lowered school rates; levy growth came mostly from tax-base growth and local rate and budget decisions. | Unsupported as stated |
| Tax bills are driven by property values as well as tax rates. | Correct: levy = taxable value x rate / 100, after exemptions, limits, and ceilings. | Correct description of the Tax Code framework. | A falling rate on a faster-growing base still produces a larger levy. | Accurate |
| The Comptroller, through the appraisal district ratio study, drives appraisals higher and higher. | The value used for school funding exceeded appraisal districts' own values by only 0.03%–0.32% statewide each year, 2015–2025; appraisal-district values themselves rose from $2.12T to $4.13T. | The ratio study (Tax Code §5.10) only measures and publishes appraisal accuracy. The property value study (Gov't Code §403.302) can reduce a school district's state aid when local values fall more than about 5% below market, but taxes are still billed on the appraisal district's values. The 5% test predates Abbott; the 2003 grace period loosened it. | The study enforces a market-value floor; rising market prices, not the Comptroller, moved appraisals. | False (ratio study); Misleading (property value study) |
| The state raises values and generates the resulting property-tax revenue. | The taxable base grew substantially, but the entire $89.45B 2025 levy belongs to local taxing units. | Texas has no state property tax; school districts, cities, counties, and special districts impose and receive the levy. | State law structures appraisal, but rising local values do not send the resulting levy to the state. | False |
| Abbott's push to restrict local tax-rate increases merely conceals state tax increases. | Unsupported: there is no state property-tax revenue to conceal. | The 2019 law lowered the election trigger for most cities and counties from 8% to 3.5% revenue growth; the state does not adopt local rates. | Rate limits reduce local revenue growth even when market values rise. | Unsupported |
| The market-value appraisal framework is an Abbott-era mechanism. | Not numerical. | Enacted in 1979 by S.B. 621 (Chapter 841), effective principally January 1, 1982. | The framework predates Abbott's 2015 inauguration by about 36 years. | False |
| Statewide school taxable value rose from about $1.859T (2013) to about $4.133T (2025). | Reproduced: $1,859.05B (2012–2013 biennial report) and $4,132.58B (2025 preliminary local tax roll value). | Values are a statewide school measure, not individual homestead appraisals. | Growth combines appreciation, new construction, commercial property, and population growth. | Accurate; causally incomplete |
| Local officials did not cause the taxable-value increase. | Too categorical: the appraisal districts' own local values rose from $2.12T to $4.13T (2015–2025); the state's certified values differed by 0.32% or less. | Appraisal districts are local bodies; city and county governing bodies do not appraise parcels but do shape development, annexation, and infrastructure. | Market appreciation, new construction, and local growth policy all expand the base. | False as an absolute statement |
| Abbott personally caused the rise in market values. | Not demonstrated by any record reviewed. | The governor neither buys nor appraises property; appraisal districts value property at market value under 1979 law. | Market prices are set by buyers and sellers; state policy affects only how much value is taxed. | Unsupported |
| The average school tax rate fell from about $1.33 (2014) to about $1.01 (2024). | Reproduced only as value-weighted rates: $1.3248 (2014) and $1.0193 (2024). Simple district means were $1.2648 and $0.9815. | School M&O rates are capped by state compression formulas set in 2019 and 2023 law. | The decline coincides with state-funded compression in 2019 (H.B. 3) and 2023 (S.B. 2). | Approximately accurate; method undisclosed |
| Declining school rates resulted largely from state law, not voluntary local action. | Weighted school rate fell from $1.3653 (2018) to $1.2908 (2019) and from $1.1828 (2022) to $1.0184 (2023), the years compression took effect. | H.B. 3 (2019) and S.B. 2 (2023) set maximum compressed M&O rates. | Strong for school M&O rates; not established for every city, county, or special-district rate. | Supported (school districts) |
| Lower rates combined with higher levies prove the state, not local officials, raised taxes. | Arithmetic shows only that the base grew faster than rates fell. | Local units adopt their own rates and can stay at or below the no-new-revenue rate. | The inference does not follow; it ignores local budgets, debt, new property, and state-required compression. | Incorrect inference |
| The entire increase can be blamed on one official in Austin. | Not numerical. | Authority is divided among the Legislature, governor, Comptroller, appraisal districts, review boards, local governing bodies, voters, and courts. | Multiple interacting causes produced the increase. | Unsupported (rhetorical) |
| Abbott and Republicans did nothing to reduce property taxes. | Contradicted: exemption raised $15K → $25K → $40K → $100K → $140K; school compression funded in 2019 and 2023. | Seven enacted measures, 2015–2025, all signed by Governor Abbott. | Relief lowered bills relative to what prior law would have produced, even where final bills rose. | False |
| Democrats historically voted against these relief measures. | Mixed. 2019 S.B. 2: all 50 House conference nays and 11 of 12 Senate final nays were Democrats. 2015: most Senate nays were Democrats. 2023: all 9 House nays were Democrats. 2019 H.B. 3, 2021, and 2025 measures: no Democratic nays. | Verified from official journals and LRL party rosters. | Supported for specific votes; not supported as a blanket statement. | Partly supported (measure-specific) |
| Market-value growth outpaced state relief. | Statewide school taxable value more than doubled (2013–2025) while the weighted school rate fell about 23% (2014–2024); total levies rose 85.8%. | Relief changed rates and exemptions; it did not freeze values. | Supported at the aggregate level; exact household effects vary. | Supported |
| Rising aggregate levies prove the relief was fictitious. | Applying the 2014 weighted school rate to the 2025 school base would yield roughly $54–55B versus the actual $41.7B calculated school levy (illustrative arithmetic only). | Relief is measured against what prior law would have produced. | The illustration does not account for all behavioral and base changes, so it is not a formal counterfactual estimate. | False |
| Market values are outside the governor's control, though the Legislature can change the formula. | Not numerical. | Prices are set by buyers and sellers; the Legislature sets appraisal standards, exemptions, limits, compression, and voter-approval rates. | Accurate with the qualification that state law shapes how much value is taxed. | Accurate with qualification |
| The 1979 law was passed by identifiable parties and signed by a particular governor. | Totals verified from the enrolled-bill certification: Senate 17–6 (one paired), House 67–65, Senate concurrence 15–14. | Authored by Democrat Grant Jones, sponsored by Democrat Wayne Peveto, approved by Republican Governor Bill Clements on June 13, 1979. | Bipartisan and narrow. Member-level party splits (from Session 2 journal work) show divided votes in both parties; the 1979 journal pages themselves are not yet archived in this package. | Supported (totals verified; party splits provisional) |
The post’s numbers are largely accurate. Its central conclusion—that a state official in Austin, rather than local governments and a rising market, raised Texans’ property taxes—is not supported by the official record.
References
Sources are organized by the sections of this article they principally inform. All sources are primary government records, official data, or peer-reviewed research; no internal working documents are cited.
The Post Examined — Section 1
Eternal [@Et3rnalStoic]. (2026, October 4). I'm going to explain this as cleanly as I can. Property taxes - up 85% under Abbott [Post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/Et3rnalStoic/posts/pfbid032ZqQB4VzuwM522SPaEyv6rJS2ePkJLz8ZUdkUFr844sgQQMg7CdbwHZY8XZPqpJWl
The original public Facebook post this article responds to, quoted and embedded in full so readers can see the author's own words in context. It makes the 85 percent levy claim, the 2013 and 2025 school taxable-value claims, the 2014 and 2024 school-rate claims, and the argument that the Comptroller and Governor Abbott, not local officials, are raising property taxes. Every one of those claims is tested in this article.
Levy Data and Economic Controls — Sections 1, 2, and 7
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2016). Biennial property tax report: Tax years 2014 and 2015 (Publication 96-1728). https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/docs/96-1728-14-15.pdf
The original-era report for tax years 2014 and 2015, published in December 2016. It reported a 2014 statewide levy of $49.11 billion, about $956 million more than the figure in later reports. The analysis uses it to show that the post's 85 percent figure depends on which official vintage of the 2014 number is used (85.8 percent with the revised figure, 82.2 percent with the original).
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2024). Biennial property tax report: Tax years 2022 and 2023 (Publication 96-1728). https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/docs/96-1728-22-23.pdf
The Comptroller's December 2024 statutory report to the Legislature on the Texas property-tax system. Appendix 5 supplies the statewide calculated levy for school districts, cities, counties, and special districts for tax years 1998 through 2023, including the revised 2014 total of $48.15 billion used as the 2014 benchmark in this analysis. The report describes its levy figures as calculated amounts rather than actual collections, which is why this work labels every levy figure as a calculated levy.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-a). Tax rates and levies [Data set and workbooks, tax years 2021–2025]. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/rates/
The Comptroller's index of downloadable unit-level workbooks of tax rates and calculated levies reported by appraisal districts under Tax Code Section 5.091. The 2024 and 2025 statewide levies and all 2021–2025 rate statistics by taxing-unit type were calculated from the twenty workbooks captured on October 5, 2026. The 2025 records are labeled working and may still be revised.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2026). Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items in U.S. city average (CUUR0000SA0) [Data set]. https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0
The federal government's standard inflation measure. Annual averages of the twelve monthly values were used to restate the 2014 levy in 2025 dollars; prices rose about 36 percent over the period. This lets readers separate general inflation from real growth in property-tax levies.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2025). Annual estimates of the resident population for the United States, regions, states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2020 to July 1, 2025 (NST-EST2025-POP) [Data set]. https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-state-total.html
Official Census Bureau population estimates used for Texas resident population from 2020 through 2025, spliced with the Vintage 2020 series for 2014 through 2019. Population is the denominator for the per-resident levy calculation, which shows that population growth explains part, but not most, of the nominal levy increase.
U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d.). Building Permits Survey: Annual state data, 2014–2025 [Data set]. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://www.census.gov/construction/bps/
Annual counts of privately owned housing units authorized by building permits in Texas. The count rose from 99,701 units in 2014 to 140,579 in 2025. It is used only as an indicator of construction activity; it does not measure the taxable value of new property and is never treated as such.
School Values and Rates — Section 3
Texas Education Agency. (2026). School district property values and tax rates [Data set]. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://tea.texas.gov/about-tea/state-funding/additional-finance-resources/school-district-property-values-and-tax-rates
TEA's distribution page for the Comptroller's School District Property Value Study files and the adopted school tax-rate file. These district-level files for 2010 through 2025 (2025 preliminary) were used to reproduce the post's statewide school taxable values and to calculate simple and value-weighted school tax rates.
Legal Structure and the 1979 Property Tax Code — Section 4
House Study Group. (1979). Bill analysis: S.B. 621 [Scanned analysis]. Texas House of Representatives. https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/hroBillAnalyses/66-0/SB621.pdf
The House's own contemporaneous nonpartisan analysis of S.B. 621, prepared for members before the House vote. It is an image-only scan, so it is archived for reference and was not machine-searched. It documents how the bill was understood when it was debated.
Legislative Reference Library of Texas. (n.d.-a). S.B. 621, 66th Legislature, Regular Session: Bill history. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://lrl.texas.gov/legis/billsearch/BillDetails.cfm?legSession=66-0&billTypeDetail=SB&billNumberDetail=621
The library's official record of S.B. 621's author (Senator Grant Jones), House sponsor (Representative Wayne Peveto), companion bill, and session-law chapter. It also records approval by Governor Bill Clements. It anchors the identification of who carried and signed the 1979 law.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-b). Truth-in-taxation: Tax rate calculations. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/truth-in-taxation/calculations.php
The Comptroller's official explanation of the no-new-revenue and voter-approval tax rates that every taxing unit must calculate. It is the source for the plain-language explanation that the no-new-revenue rate is a benchmark, not a rate the state imposes, and that a governing body choosing a higher rate is choosing to collect more revenue from existing property.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-c). Property tax exemptions. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/exemptions/index.php
The Comptroller's current guidance on exemptions. It states that Tax Code Section 11.13(b) requires school districts to grant a $140,000 residence homestead exemption and that other taxing units may adopt a local-option exemption of up to 20 percent. It confirms the current exemption amount after the 2025 changes.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-d). Texas property tax system basics. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/basics.php
The Comptroller's overview of who does what in Texas property taxation. It states that Texas has no state property tax, that appraisal districts value property, and that local taxing units set rates and collect taxes. It is the primary authority for the responsibility table.
Texas Legislature. (1979a). Legislative bill file for S.B. 621, 66th Legislature, Regular Session [Bill file]. Legislative Reference Library of Texas. https://lrl.texas.gov/LASDOCS/66R/SB621/SB621_66R.pdf
The 1,141-page legislative file for the bill that created the modern Texas Property Tax Code. The enrolled bill's certification page records Senate passage on May 4, 1979 (17 yeas, 6 nays, one paired), House passage on May 24, 1979 (67 yeas, 65 nays, one present not voting), and Senate concurrence on May 26, 1979 (15 yeas, 14 nays). It is the primary evidence that the market-value appraisal system predates Governor Abbott by more than three decades.
Texas Legislature. (1979b). Property Tax Code, ch. 841, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2217. In General and special laws of the State of Texas, 66th Legislature, Regular Session. https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/sessionLaws/66-0/SB_621_CH_841.pdf
The official session-law text of S.B. 621 as enacted. It adopted Title 1 of the Tax Code, created countywide appraisal districts and appraisal review boards, and set the framework for appraising property at market value. It is the controlling text for what the 1979 Legislature enacted.
Appraisal Oversight — Section 4
Haney, J. (2015, October). The (long, long) history of the Texas property tax. Fiscal Notes. Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/archive/2015/october/proptax.php
A Comptroller history of Texas property taxation. It explains that the 1979 Peveto reforms created countywide appraisal districts, required full market-value appraisal, and created the State Property Tax Board, whose oversight functions were folded into the Comptroller's office in 1991. It also reports a statewide single-family appraisal ratio of 98 percent of market value, showing that appraisals were, if anything, slightly below market.
House Research Organization. (2002, August 5). Property tax appraisal: Issues and responses (Focus Report). Texas House of Representatives. https://hro.house.texas.gov/focus/property.pdf
A nonpartisan House research report from 13 years before Abbott took office. It describes the property value study's margin-of-error test (not less than 5 percent), the substitution of state value for invalid local value, and the resulting loss of state aid, then a proposed grace period. It shows the mechanism the post describes already existed long before the Abbott era.
Determination of school district property values, Tex. Gov't Code §§ 403.302, 403.3011 (2024). https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.403.htm
The statute that governs the property value study. Section 403.302(c) makes a district's local value presumptively correct when valid and requires a margin of error 'that does not exceed five percent'; if local value is invalid, the state value is used for school funding unless local value is higher. Section 403.3011, added in 2003, creates the grace period for eligible districts. The amendment history lists Abbott-era amendments that coincide with the 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2023 relief laws. Because the official statutes site blocked automated retrieval, the text was read through a public codification mirror and should be confirmed on the official site before quotation.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2017, October 1). Property tax today (Vol. 2) [Newsletter]. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/newsletter/vol2-oct17.php
A Comptroller newsletter reporting that the 2016 final study found 1,515 of the school districts studied received local value and only 40 received state value. It also explains that in 2016 the Comptroller reinterpreted the grace-period statute so that an eligible district automatically keeps its local value for the second year, a change that eased, rather than tightened, the consequences of the study.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-e). Appraisal district ratio study. Retrieved October 6, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/ratio-study/
The Comptroller's official description of the ratio study the post links to. It states that Tax Code Section 5.10 requires the Comptroller to measure each appraisal district's performance at least once every two years and publish the results, and that the study measures 'the uniformity and median level of appraisals' using data from the school district property value study. The page describes a measurement and publication duty only; it does not give the Comptroller power to set or change any property's value.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-f). School district property value study (SDPVS). Retrieved October 6, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/pvs/
The Comptroller's page for the study that actually carries consequences. It states that Government Code Section 403.302 requires the Comptroller to estimate the total taxable value of each school district at least once every two years and certify it to the commissioner of education, who uses it to distribute school funding, and that the results 'can affect a school district's state funding.' It also describes the 40-day protest right school districts have.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (n.d.-g). Valuing property. Retrieved October 6, 2026. https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/valuing-property.php
The page the post quotes. It states that Tax Code Section 23.01 requires appraisal districts to appraise property at market value as of January 1, that Section 25.18 requires reappraisal at least every three years, and that 'each appraisal district determines the value of all taxable property within the county boundaries.' It also quotes the statement every appraisal notice must carry: 'The Texas Legislature does not set the amount of your local taxes. Your property tax burden is decided by your locally elected officials.'
Texas Education Agency. (2025, March 6). School district property value study and the Foundation School Program [Presentation to the House Subcommittee on Property Tax Appraisals]. Texas House of Representatives. https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/89R/handouts/C4922025030610301/de260ba0-ef33-49d6-8543-2ea439ee51b1.PDF
TEA's testimony to a House subcommittee explaining how the property value study affects school funding. It states that when local values are invalid, higher state values are used to calculate a district's local share, that 'school district taxes are collected on the appraisal district's assessment (regardless of whether state values are substituted),' and that the result is less state aid for that district. It also describes the two-year grace period and the steps that follow three consecutive invalid findings.
Relief Legislation — Section 5
Legislative Budget Board. (2015). Fiscal note, S.B. 1, 84th Legislature, Regular Session (conference committee report). https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/fiscalnotes/html/SB00001F.htm
The Legislature's official cost estimate for the 2015 homestead-exemption increase. It projected a $1.24 billion cost to general revenue in the 2016–2017 biennium, mostly state aid to replace school revenue lost to the larger exemption. It shows the 2015 relief was funded with state dollars.
Senate Committee on Finance. (2022). Interim report to the 88th Legislature. Texas Senate. https://senate.texas.gov/cmtes/87/c540/c540_InterimReport_2022.pdf
The Senate Finance Committee's report on implementing the 2019 school-finance law. It states that the initial estimated cost of H.B. 3 compression was about $5 billion for the 2020–2021 biennium and that compression grows as district property values rise. It supports the finding that much of the post-2019 drop in school rates was required and funded by the state.
Senate Research Center. (2023). Bill analysis, S.B. 2, 88th Legislature, 2nd Called Session (enrolled). https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/882/analysis/html/SB00002F.htm
The Senate's nonpartisan analysis of the 2023 relief law. It summarizes the exemption history ($15,000 to $25,000 in 2015, $40,000 after voter approval in May 2022, and $100,000 under S.B. 2), 10.7 cents of additional school-rate compression, and a 20 percent appraisal limit for non-homestead property valued under $5 million that expires December 31, 2026.
Texas Legislature. (2019). S.B. 2, 86th Legislature, Regular Session: Enrolled version (Texas Property Tax Reform and Transparency Act of 2019). https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/html/SB00002F.HTM
The enacted text of the 2019 law that replaced the rollback rate with the voter-approval rate, cut the general revenue-growth threshold for many taxing units from 8 percent to 3.5 percent, made elections automatic above that rate, and expanded truth-in-taxation notices. It is the primary source for how state law limits local revenue growth.
Texas Legislature Online. (n.d.). Bill histories: 84(R) S.B. 1 and S.J.R. 1; 86(R) S.B. 2 and H.B. 3; 87(2) S.B. 8 and S.J.R. 2; 88(2) S.B. 2 and H.J.R. 2; 89(R) S.B. 4 and S.J.R. 2. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=86R&Bill=SB2
The Legislature's official action histories for each relief measure. They list authors, sponsors, every recorded vote with its record number and journal page, and the date of the governor's signature (for example, S.B. 2 and H.B. 3 on June 12, 2019; S.B. 2 on July 22, 2023; S.B. 4 on June 16, 2025). These histories were used to locate each decisive vote in the journals.
Recorded Votes — Section 6
Legislative Reference Library of Texas. (n.d.-b). Party affiliation: 66th, 84th, 86th, 88th, and 89th Legislatures. Retrieved October 5, 2026. https://lrl.texas.gov/legeleaders/members/partyListSession.cfm?leg=86
Official party rosters for each Legislature as of the first day of the regular session, with tables for members who joined or left later. Every journal-listed name in the vote tables was matched to these rosters to classify votes by party. Where the journal used only a surname or initials, the match method is recorded in the member-level vote file.
Texas House of Representatives. (2015). House journal, 84th Legislature, Regular Session (78th, 79th, and 83rd days). https://journals.house.texas.gov/hjrnl/84r/pdf/84RDAY79FINAL.PDF
Official daily House journals recording Record Votes 1424 (S.J.R. 1, 138–0), 1437 (S.B. 1 final passage, 141–0), and 1733 (S.B. 1 conference report, 138–0). These record the House votes on the 2015 increase of the school homestead exemption from $15,000 to $25,000, with every member's vote listed by name.
Texas House of Representatives. (2019). House journal, 86th Legislature, Regular Session (38th, 55th, 56th, and 74th days). https://journals.house.texas.gov/hjrnl/86r/pdf/86RDAY56FINAL.PDF
Official House journals for the 2019 property-tax and school-finance laws. For S.B. 2 they record second reading (Record 833, 107–40), third reading (Record 839, 109–36), and the conference report (Record 1939, 88–50). Every Republican voting supported S.B. 2 at each stage, and all 50 conference-report nays were Democrats. For H.B. 3 they record final passage (Record 159, 148–1) and the conference report (Record 1941, 139–0).
Texas Legislature. (2021). House and Senate journals, 87th Legislature, 2nd Called Session (August 9–10 and August 26–27, 2021). https://journals.house.texas.gov/hjrnl/872/pdf/87C2DAY04FINAL.PDF
Official journals for S.B. 8 (homestead exemption available in the year of purchase) and S.J.R. 2 (school homestead exemption raised from $25,000 to $40,000). S.B. 8 passed the Senate 29–0 and the House 121–0; S.J.R. 2 passed the Senate 29–0 and the House 116–0. No member voted against either measure.
Texas Legislature. (2023). House and Senate journals, 88th Legislature, 2nd Called Session (July 12–13, 2023). https://journals.house.texas.gov/hjrnl/882/pdf/88C2DAY06FINAL.PDF
Official journals for the 2023 relief package. S.B. 2 passed the Senate 31–0 and the House 133–4; H.J.R. 2 was adopted 132–5 in the House and 31–0 in the Senate. All nine House nays across the two measures were cast by Democrats, while most House Democrats voted yes.
Texas Legislature. (2025). House and Senate journals, 89th Legislature, Regular Session (February 13 and May 20–29, 2025). https://journals.house.texas.gov/hjrnl/89r/pdf/89RDAY69FINAL.PDF
Official journals for the 2025 exemption increase from $100,000 to $140,000. S.B. 4 passed the Senate 30–0 and the House 143–0, and the Senate concurred 31–0. S.J.R. 2 passed the Senate 30–0 and the House 143–0. No legislator of either party voted no.
Texas Senate. (2015). Senate journal, 84th Legislature, Regular Session (March 25 and May 29, 2015). https://journals.senate.texas.gov/sjrnl/84r/pdf/84RSJ03-25-F.PDF
Official Senate journals for the 2015 exemption measures. S.B. 1 passed 26–5 and S.J.R. 1 passed 23–8; the Senate later adopted the S.B. 1 conference report and concurred on S.J.R. 1, each 25–6. Four of the five original S.B. 1 nays and seven of the eight S.J.R. 1 nays were Democrats. This corrects an earlier working summary that described 2015 support as near-universal.
Texas Senate. (2019). Senate journal, 86th Legislature, Regular Session (April 15, May 6, and May 25, 2019). https://journals.senate.texas.gov/sjrnl/86r/pdf/86RSJ04-15-F.PDF
Official Senate journals for 2019. S.B. 2 finally passed 18–12 with one present not voting; all 18 yeas were Republicans, and 11 of the 12 nays were Democrats. The S.B. 2 conference report was adopted 21–9 with all nine nays Democrats. H.B. 3 passed 26–2, with both nays Republicans, and its conference report passed 30–0.
Policy Observation — Section 7
Brueckner, J. K., & Kim, H.-A. (2003). Urban sprawl and the property tax. International Tax and Public Finance, 10(1), 5–23. https://matthewturner.org/ec2410/readings/Breuckner_Kim_ITPF_2003.pdf
A peer-reviewed economic model of how a property tax affects how far a city spreads out. The authors find the effect is theoretically ambiguous: the tax discourages building improvements, which pushes toward lower density, but it also shrinks housing consumption, which pushes the other way. It is cited to show why the article presents the taxable-footprint point as an observation, not a proven causal law.
Inspect the Data
Explore the data behind this article — one tab per dataset. Each tab includes the data table, a download, and a note explaining how it was produced.
| Year | School | City | County | Special | Total | Real (2025 $) | Per resident |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | $26.57B | $7.77B | $7.45B | $6.36B | $48.15B | $65.48B | $1,753 |
| 2015 | $27.89B | $8.32B | $8.02B | $6.95B | $51.18B | $69.52B | $1,834 |
| 2016 | $29.47B | $9.10B | $8.34B | $8.03B | $54.93B | $73.69B | $1,942 |
| 2017 | $31.75B | $9.73B | $9.14B | $9.13B | $59.76B | $78.48B | $2,088 |
| 2018 | $34.72B | $10.39B | $9.60B | $8.49B | $63.20B | $81.03B | $2,180 |
| 2019 | $36.07B | $11.15B | $10.42B | $8.91B | $66.55B | $83.80B | $2,272 |
| 2020 | $37.76B | $11.96B | $11.29B | $9.49B | $70.50B | $87.70B | $2,411 |
| 2021 | $38.95B | $12.50B | $11.69B | $10.40B | $73.54B | $87.37B | $2,487 |
| 2022 | $43.95B | $13.63B | $12.80B | $10.41B | $80.79B | $88.88B | $2,682 |
| 2023 | $39.50B | $15.05B | $14.17B | $12.72B | $81.44B | $86.05B | $2,651 |
| 2024 | $41.66B | $15.71B | $15.73B | $13.50B | $86.60B | $88.88B | $2,765 |
| 2025 | $41.65B | $16.73B | $16.79B | $14.27B | $89.45B | $89.45B | $2,821 |
| Year | Population | CPI-U | Deflator to 2025 | Units authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 27,468,531 | 236.736 | 1.3599 | 99,701 |
| 2015 | 27,914,064 | 237.017 | 1.3583 | 105,448 |
| 2016 | 28,291,024 | 240.007 | 1.3414 | 106,511 |
| 2017 | 28,624,564 | 245.120 | 1.3134 | 116,766 |
| 2018 | 28,986,794 | 251.107 | 1.2821 | 126,048 |
| 2019 | 29,286,467 | 255.657 | 1.2593 | 129,094 |
| 2020 | 29,237,895 | 258.811 | 1.2439 | 158,242 |
| 2021 | 29,572,672 | 270.970 | 1.1881 | 179,620 |
| 2022 | 30,118,002 | 292.655 | 1.1001 | 154,793 |
| 2023 | 30,719,247 | 304.702 | 1.0566 | 149,860 |
| 2024 | 31,318,578 | 313.689 | 1.0263 | 158,121 |
| 2025 | 31,709,821 | 321.943 | 1.0000 | 140,579 |
| Year | Status | Districts | Taxable value (T2) | Weighted rate | Simple mean rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | final | 1024 | $1.671T | 1.3011 | 1.2345 |
| 2011 | final | 1024 | $1.690T | 1.3138 | 1.2444 |
| 2012 | final | 1022 | $1.768T | 1.3157 | 1.2473 |
| 2013 | final | 1020 | $1.872T | 1.3214 | 1.2546 |
| 2014 | final | 1019 | $2.036T | 1.3248 | 1.2648 |
| 2015 | final | 1018 | $2.124T | 1.3354 | 1.2813 |
| 2016 | final | 1018 | $2.229T | 1.3486 | 1.2981 |
| 2017 | final | 1018 | $2.389T | 1.3535 | 1.3052 |
| 2018 | final | 1016 | $2.569T | 1.3653 | 1.3110 |
| 2019 | final | 1016 | $2.830T | 1.2908 | 1.2393 |
| 2020 | final | 1015 | $2.989T | 1.2696 | 1.2092 |
| 2021 | final | 1007 | $3.023T | 1.2405 | 1.1826 |
| 2022 | final | 966 | $3.489T | 1.1828 | 1.1396 |
| 2023 | final | 1014 | $3.912T | 1.0184 | 0.9751 |
| 2024 | final | 1013 | $4.119T | 1.0193 | 0.9815 |
| 2025 | preliminary | 1013 | $4.135T | 1.0130 | 0.9670 |
| Measure | Chamber | Date | Stage | Result | R yes / no | D yes / no | Journal page |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 SB 1 | Senate | 03/25/2015 | Final passage / adoption | 26–5 | 19 / 1 | 7 / 4 | 583 |
| 2015 SJR 1 | Senate | 03/25/2015 | Final passage / adoption | 23–8 | 19 / 1 | 4 / 7 | 591 |
| 2015 SJR 1 | House | 05/24/2015 | Final passage / adoption | 138–0 (1 PNV) | 96 / 0 | 42 / 0 | 4439 |
| 2015 SB 1 | House | 05/25/2015 | Final passage / adoption | 141–0 (1 PNV) | 92 / 0 | 49 / 0 | 4477 |
| 2015 SB 1 | House | 05/29/2015 | Conference committee report adopted | 138–0 (1 PNV) | 95 / 0 | 43 / 0 | 5558 |
| 2015 SB 1 | Senate | 05/29/2015 | Conference committee report adopted | 25–6 | 19 / 1 | 6 / 5 | 3116 |
| 2015 SJR 1 | Senate | 05/29/2015 | Concurrence in House amendments | 25–6 | 19 / 1 | 6 / 5 | 3115 |
| 2019 HB 3 | House | 04/03/2019 | Final passage / adoption | 148–1 | 82 / 1 | 66 / 0 | 1282 |
| 2019 SB 2 | Senate | 04/15/2019 | Final passage / adoption | 18–12 (1 PNV) | 18 / 1 | 0 / 11 | 1032 |
| 2019 SB 2 | House | 04/30/2019 | Second reading (passed to third reading) | 107–40 | 81 / 0 | 26 / 40 | 2521 |
| 2019 SB 2 | House | 05/01/2019 | Final passage / adoption | 109–36 (2 PNV) | 82 / 0 | 27 / 36 | 2557 |
| 2019 HB 3 | Senate | 05/06/2019 | Final passage / adoption | 26–2 (3 PNV) | 14 / 2 | 12 / 0 | 1620 |
| 2019 SB 2 | Senate | 05/25/2019 | Conference committee report adopted | 21–9 | 19 / 0 | 2 / 9 | 3591 |
| 2019 SB 2 | House | 05/25/2019 | Conference committee report adopted | 88–50 | 81 / 0 | 7 / 50 | 5969 |
| 2019 HB 3 | Senate | 05/25/2019 | Conference committee report adopted | 30–0 | — | — | 3607 |
| 2019 HB 3 | House | 05/25/2019 | Conference committee report adopted | 139–0 | 80 / 0 | 59 / 0 | 6139 |
| 2021 SB 8, 87th 2nd C.S. | Senate | 08/09/2021 | Final passage / adoption | 29–0 | — | — | 26 |
| 2021 SJR 2, 87th 2nd C.S. | Senate | 08/09/2021 | Final passage / adoption | 29–0 | — | — | 27 |
| 2021 SJR 2, 87th 2nd C.S. | Senate | 08/10/2021 | Final passage / adoption | 29–0 | — | — | 33 |
| 2021 SJR 2, 87th 2nd C.S. | House | 08/26/2021 | Final passage / adoption | 116–0 (1 PNV) | — | — | 175 |
| 2021 SB 8, 87th 2nd C.S. | House | 08/27/2021 | Final passage / adoption | 121–0 (1 PNV) | — | — | 195 |
| 2023 SB 2, 88th 2nd C.S. | Senate | 07/12/2023 | Final passage / adoption | 31–0 | — | — | 21 |
| 2023 SB 2, 88th 2nd C.S. | House | 07/13/2023 | Final passage / adoption | 133–4 | 83 / 0 | 50 / 4 | 62 |
| 2023 HJR 2, 88th 2nd C.S. | Senate | 07/13/2023 | Final passage / adoption | 31–0 | — | — | 28 |
| 2023 HJR 2, 88th 2nd C.S. | House | 07/13/2023 | Final passage / adoption | 132–5 | 83 / 0 | 49 / 5 | 59 |
| 2025 SB 4 | Senate | 02/13/2025 | Final passage / adoption | 30–0 | — | — | 241 |
| 2025 SJR 2 | Senate | 02/13/2025 | Final passage / adoption | 30–0 | — | — | 242 |
| 2025 SJR 2 | House | 05/20/2025 | Final passage / adoption | 143–0 (1 PNV) | 84 / 0 | 59 / 0 | 5394 |
| 2025 SB 4 | House | 05/21/2025 | Final passage / adoption | 143–0 (1 PNV) | 84 / 0 | 59 / 0 | 5442 |
| 2025 SB 4 | Senate | 05/29/2025 | Concurrence in House amendments | 31–0 | — | — | 3177 |